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 The thesis has five chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the issue. Chapter 2 discusses 
the concept of price discrimination, conducts a literature review, and presents a 
conceptual model.  The literature review identified 106 articles relevant to price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  These provides the basis of a conceptual 
model depicting key actors and associations with price discrimination in the US cancer 
drug market.  
 Chapter 3 analyzes the evidence of price discrimination and examines demand 
factors suggested in Chapter 2.  Using theory on price discrimination in markets with 
imperfect competition, price dispersion is examined in single and multi-source cancer 
drugs in US markets.  The primary data is a large commercial claims database covering 
years 2010-2014.  In the single source market, smaller discounts (14.7% versus 60%) and 
smaller levels of dispersion (5.6% versus 43%) are observed relative to the multi-source 
market, suggesting evidence of price discrimination. Multivariate analysis found some 
demand factors such as health plan and age are associated with price discrimination. 
Health plan type is minimally associated with price discounts.  No evidence exists for 
type 2 price discrimination.  
 Chapter 4 quantifies pricing trends and assesses the impact of price discrimination 
in the US cancer drug market using same data from Chapter 3.  For single source drugs, 
Average Wholesale Prices increased 76%, transaction prices increased 74%, and patient 
cost-sharing increased 29% from 2010-2014. The gap between the 10th and 90th 
percentile paid for single source drugs increased from $183 to $474.  Plans with 
capitation and non-capitated plans experienced price increases of grew 4.3% and 5.7%, 
respectively.  Multivariate analysis suggest a 10% increase in price dispersion is 
associated with a utilization increase of 1.1% in single source drugs.  Each additional 
manufacturer is associated with a 15.5% increase in utilization.  
The thesis found evidence for price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  
There was evidence supporting some of the associations depicted in the conceptual 
model, notably the association of health plan type and price discrimination; other 
associations had no evidence.  Results suggest a growing trend in prices and price 
discrimination increases access, albeit as a small effect. 
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 Pharmaceuticals have been described as having different prices across markets.  
Some researchers have defined a market to be a country and have documented price 
differentials for pharmaceuticals across countries.1 2 Others have examined markets 
within countries and documented price differentials for pharmaceuticals3 including price 
differentials by indication,4 and by income.5  Researchers have routinely discussed the 
levels of these price differentials, with the majority of the research focus on price 
differentials across countries.  Danzon and Furukawa found that drug prices in the seven 
developed countries are on average approximately 6-33% lower than the prices paid in 
the US6, other researchers have found even greater variation with a five-fold gap between 
the top and bottom 20th percentile.7  Many researchers have empirically analyzed 
explanations behind the price differentials.8 9  
 While researchers debate on the levels and associated factors, there is general 
consensus that price differentials for pharmaceuticals is attributable to the pharmaceutical 
company’s ability to price discriminate.  Price discrimination is defined as the ability of a 
firm to set different prices for the same product.  A firm that price discriminates sets 
prices above the firms’ marginal cost.  This enables the firm to capture additional surplus 
from the consumer in the form of higher profits.  Multiple different prices can be set 
                                                          
1 Danzon, P. M., & Chao, L. W. (2000). 
2 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
3 Frank, R. G. (2001). 
4 Baslevent, C. (2005). 
5 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
6 Danzon, P. M., & Furukawa, M. F. (2003). 
7 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
8 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
9 Helble, M., & Aizawa, T. (2016). 
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along the demand curve to maximize profit; these multiple prices would correspond to 
different consumers’ willingness to pay for the drug.   
In a perfectly competitive market, there is no price discrimination since firms 
cannot act as price setters (a necessary condition for price discrimination to be discussed 
later).  If a firm attempted to set a price above equilibrium, then in a perfectly competitive 
market with no barriers to entry, a new firm would enter the market and price closer to 
equilibrium.  In the long run, with no firms able to set a price, there is only one clearing 
price for the market, occurring at the intersection of the aggregate market supply and 
demand curves.  
 In a classic textbook definition, price discrimination would only occur in a 
monopolistic market, otherwise, competing firms would enter the market if prices are 
above marginal costs.  However, in a market with imperfect competition,10 a firm may be 
in a situation where it can price discriminate by charging different prices to different 
consumers.  Theoretical background for this suggestion is provided by Borenstein11 and 
Holmes.12  Borenstein used a spatial model of monopolistic competition and showed that 
competition is not a barrier to price discrimination as long as “gaps” in the market are 
driven by consumer brand preferences.  Holmes13 used mathematical proofs to show 
price discrimination could exist in situations with few suppliers.  In his model, price 
discrimination can be explained by the ratio between the difference of two firm’s own 
                                                          
10 Imperfect competition is a broad term describing both monopolistic and oligopolistic competition.  Both 
of these competitive environments have firms produce goods with some market power.  It is important to 
note the difference between a true monopoly and monopolistic competition, as a true monopoly is one 
producer with no substitutes pricing at marginal revenue=marginal cost.  Monopolistic competition can 
have multiple producers each producing a product with some monopoly power but also weak substitutes. 
Pricing is more flexible but often is determined by the Lerner’s Markup. 
11 Borenstein, S. (1985).  
12 Holmes, T. J. (1989).  
13 Holmes, T. J. (1989).  
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price elasticities of demand and the cross price elasticity of demand.  Both theories are 
similar in the sense that they both suggest price discrimination can occur in imperfect 
markets and is due in part to market power (products differentiable) and cross-price 
elasticities. 
Price discrimination enables the firm to capture a greater portion of consumer 
surplus.  The consumer surplus is transferred from the patient to the producer in the form 
of higher profits for the firm.  Consumer surplus represents the difference between the 
price paid and the price the consumer is willing to pay for drug.  This difference is the 
added benefit to the consumer of taking the drug.  By shifting the consumer surplus to the 
producer, the drug maker is taking away the benefit of the medication for the consumer.  
For illustrative purposes, if a drug adds 1 year of life on average to patients with brain 
cancer and a patient values his/her year of life at $100,000, then a drug that costs $60,000 
has a $40,000 benefit to the patient.  But if the company raises the price to $100,000, then 
the patient loses $40,000 in benefit, and would actually be indifferent to the drug even if 
it adds a year of life.  In this example, the $40,000 is a measure of the benefit of the drug 
and not an actual monetary exchange.  The transfer of consumer surplus to the firm raises 
concerns regarding fairness, which will be discussed throughout the chapters.   
For price discrimination to exist, three necessary conditions are required.14    
1. A firm must be able to act as a price setter, such that an individual firm’s demand 
curve is downward sloping akin to an aggregate market demand curve 
2. A firm must control the sale of its product 
                                                          
14 Varian, H. R. (1989).  
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3. A firm must be able to sort consumers by their demand (different demand 
elasticities for a drug) 
 The first condition stipulates the pharmaceutical company must be able to act as a 
price setter.  Economists define price setters as firms that are powerful enough to set the 
price they charge in a market as opposed to price takers who take the price the market 
sets (intersection of the supply and demand curve).  A key characteristic for price setters 
is the individual firms demand curve is downward sloping and resembles the aggregate 
market demand curve, as opposed to a price-taker who faces a horizontal demand curve.  
The price-taker’s demand curve is horizontal because the market (producers and 
consumers) has established a market clearing price for the product.  Branded drug 
companies are able to act as price setters because of market protections and the imperfect 
nature of the US drug market.  For branded drugs, patent protection and market 
exclusivity are the main instruments that allow a pharmaceutical company to price set, 
since these protections prevents competitors from copying the drug and entering the 
market.  While both instruments provide market protections, patents are issued by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for a fixed 20 years, while market exclusivities are 
granted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for various time periods depending 
on drug application.  For generic drugs, drug companies have some market power 
because of the imperfect competition within the drug market.  A driving factor behind the 
imperfect competition within the drug market is barriers to entry largely due to regulatory 
hurdles for generics.15  
                                                          
15 Wiske, C. P., Ogbechie, O. A., & Schulman, K. A. (2015). 
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The second condition required for price discrimination is that a drug company can 
control the sale of its pharmaceuticals.  This condition is met because of legal and 
regulatory constraints within the pharmaceutical market.  US law regulates the reselling 
of pharmaceuticals such that sales are often strictly limited between the wholesaler and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.16  Specific to the US, a key law limiting arbitrage of 
pharmaceuticals is the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of 1987.  This law 
limits the resale of drugs to wholesalers, stipulates wholesale regulations, and further 
directs state governments to regulate wholesalers.17  The PDMA also prevents re-
importation of pharmaceuticals; therefore, preventing trans-geographic market 
transactions.  In addition, contracts between insurer and suppliers (pharmaceutical 
manufacturers or wholesalers) prevent health insurers from purchasing pharmaceuticals 
at a negotiated price and then reselling the pharmaceuticals to other health insurers.18  
This applies to both single and multi-source drugs. 
The third condition is that the drug company must be able to segment the market 
based on consumers’ heterogeneous utilities for the drug (different demand elasticities).  
Consumers in the drug market can be considered either patients or payers.  Patients are 
considered consumers since they are the people ultimately filling and consuming the 
drug.  However, it is misleading to consider patients a typical consumer who shop and 
demand prescription pharmaceuticals for three reasons.  First, patients are not legally able 
to self-prescribe; they cannot demand a drug themselves and must rely on a physician for 
drug demand.  Second, patients rarely demand a specific drug rather they demand better 
                                                          
16 Berndt, E. R., & Newhouse, J. P. (2010). 
17 Angarola, R. T., & Beach, J. E. (1996).  
18 Frank, R. G. (2001). 
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health and will often “consume” the products suggested by the physician.  Third, and 
perhaps most important, insured patients in the US are rarely responsible for the full cost 
of the drug.19  Instead, insured patients will typically have their prescription health plan 
pay the majority share of prescription costs.  This relationship distorts traditional supply-
and-demand competitive forces and is why health plans should be considered the primary 
consumer in the US cancer drug market. 
Throughout the chapters, there is further discussion of the existing research on the 
US cancer drug market with an emphasis on how features of this market satisfy the three 
necessary conditions for price discrimination.  The discussion of the necessary conditions 
is followed through with empirical analysis of the US cancer drug market using a large 
commercial claims database.  The underpinnings of the empirical analysis often relate to 
the necessary conditions for price discrimination. The necessary conditions are also 
discussed within a context of imperfect competition in the US cancer drug market. 
While there are three necessary conditions for price discrimination, economists’ 
have also defined three distinct types of price discrimination.20 Type I price 
discrimination occurs when the firm can price a product to every individual consumer’s 
maximum reserve price.  Type I price discrimination is often called perfect price 
discrimination since it completely transfers all consumer surplus to the producer.  For this 
price discrimination to occur, it is necessary for the firm to know each consumers 
maximum reserve price, which the firm will use to set each consumers price.  This price 
discrimination is rarely observed in the real world and exists primarily as a theoretical 
option.   
                                                          
19 Berndt, E. R., & Newhouse, J. P. (2010). 
20 Varian, H. R. (1989). 
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Type II price discrimination is characterized by the firm pricing a product to 
consumers based on the quantity consumed by each consumer.  Most often Type II price 
discrimination occurs when each consumer is offered a range of prices based on quantity 
purchased, something common in the pharmaceutical industry21. Type II price 
discrimination in pharmaceutical markets likely exists in two levels.  First, drug 
distributors and wholesalers may be able to exact quantity discounts from the 
pharmaceutical company depending on quantity purchased.  Second, pharmacy benefit 
managers or health insurers can negotiate discounts directly from pharmaceutical 
companies based on quantities purchased.  The level of price discrimination for 
distributors and wholesalers should be relatively small since quantity discounting can 
allow for arbitrage, but could be much larger for large pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs) or health insurers that purchase large quantities of drugs and have some degree 
of discretion on the formularies and the tiers.  In Chapter 3, empirical analysis will 
examine evidence for the presence of Type II price discrimination. 
Finally, Type III price discrimination is when the firm offers different prices for 
the same product to different groups of consumers.  Firms can incur Type III price 
discrimination by separating consumer groups by their groups’ demand elasticities.  For 
example, consider the incentives of the health insurer; an insurer, who can pass the cost 
onto the patient via high co-pays or coinsurance amounts, could be willing to accept 
higher prices since costs are partially transferred to the patient.  Another example could 
be insurers whose plan participants are younger and therefore less likely to get cancer, 
and since these insurers would fill cancer drugs at low rates per beneficiary, they may be 
                                                          
21 Berndt, E. R., & Newhouse, J. P. (2010). 
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less sensitive to the price of cancer drugs and willing to accept higher prices.  Type III 
price discrimination is the most common type discussed in current literature on price 
discrimination.   
In the international context, the consumer can be considered at the country level, 
and the country’s demand elasticity for pharmaceuticals could be largely based on the 
country’s income.  Income influences demand elasticity through what economists call the 
“income effect”, which can change the relative demand for goods as income changes.  
For drugs, a poor country may have higher price elasticity for cancer drugs because the 
Health Ministry lacks the budget to make cancer treatment a priority.  Within the US, 
Lichtenberg suggested low and high income people had better access to lower priced 
drugs than middle income people.22  Type III price discrimination will be investigated in 
both Chapters 3 and 4, and is found to be the predominant type of price discrimination in 
the US cancer drug market. 
While the word “discrimination” in the term “price discrimination” often has a 
negative connotation, economists do not think price discrimination necessarily has 
negative implications. Danzon,23 Lichtenberg,24 and Malueg and Schwartz25 all have 
argued that price discrimination in the drug market can provide benefits to society.  The 
basis for this observation is that price discrimination increases social welfare by 
increasing output. Danzon26 has been an ardent supporter of price discrimination in the 
drug market.  She has argued against policies that either promote uniform pricing or 
                                                          
22 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
23 Danzon, P. M. (1997).  
24 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
25 Malueg, D. A., & Schwartz, M. (1994). 
26 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
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increase transparency and thereby limit consumer segmentation.  The reason for her 
support of price discrimination is related to the cost structure of drugs.  She notes drugs 
incur a significant fixed upfront cost to develop and commercialize, i.e. R&D.  To 
encourage private sector investment, drug prices have to be high enough to allow for a 
net return of investment in aggregate, and under uniform pricing, this high price will limit 
access to drugs in certain markets.   
Prices are sustained high due to the market protections in the form of patents and 
market exclusivity granted by the Food and Drug Administration and European 
Medicines Agency.  These market protections allow the drug company to set prices well 
in excess of the marginal cost to produce the drug.  In a uniform pricing environment, 
these high prices may be at such a level that they are unaffordable in poor countries.  
However, price discrimination allows drug companies to set low prices for these poor 
countries access the market, a suggestion not only by Danzon27 but others28 29 as well 
including the World Health Organization.30  With price discrimination and setting prices 
low enough to enter poor markets, drug companies can profit while patients in these 
markets can access drugs that are normally unaffordable.  In general, an increase in 
output is considered welfare increasing. However, the benefits of price discrimination in 
the domestic market are less clear. 
 In Chapter 4, the study assesses price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market.  The assessment of the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
                                                          
27 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
28 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010).  
29 Malueg, D. A., & Schwartz, M. (1994).  




market is based on access, fairness, and equity, with empirical analysis directly assessing 
the issue of access.  Related, in Chapter 4, it is suggested that policymakers are less 
interested in welfare and more interested in access that can be correlated to social 
welfare.   
 The study focuses on the US cancer drug market for several reasons.  First, cancer 
drugs, also known as antineoplastic, cancer, or oncologic drugs, is a large market, with 
2015 US cancer drugs sales at $49 billion and expected continued growth.31  These drugs 
are often high-cost with the average cost per month of branded cancer drugs estimated at 
$10,000.32  Branded denotes a company’s drug is protected by a patent or market 
exclusivity granted by either the US Patent and Trademark Office or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) respectively.  These mechanisms prevent competitors from 
copying the drug and entering the market, thereby limiting the supply of a drug to just 
one firm-creating nearly monopolistic or oligopolistic situations depending on similarities 
of substitutes.  In addition, the high-prices are also the result of the underlying 
pharmaceutical market33 that has been characterized as imperfect due to barriers to entry 
(expense to develop a new drug or regulatory hurdles), agency (physicians acting in both 
their own economic interest and the patient’s interest), and asymmetric information 
(patients have difficulty assessing the value of a drug).34 
 The second reason for focusing on cancer drugs is related to the issue of rebates, 
discounts, and chargebacks.  These issues are an important characteristic of the US drug 
                                                          
31 IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics. Global Oncology Trend Report: A review of 2015 and outlook 
to 2020. 2016;https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IMS-Institute-Global-Oncology-
Report-05.31.16.pdf. (Accessed Feb. 4, 2017). 
32 Johnson, K., Blansett, L., Mawrie, R., & Di Biase, S. (2014). 
33 Bach, P. B. (2015). 
34 Rattinger, G. B., Jain, R., Ju, J., & Mullins, C. D. (2008). 
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market in general.35  The way drugs are priced and sold in the market involves multiple 
entities notably the drug manufacturer, PBM, pharmacy, patient, and health plan.  The 
drug manufacturer contracts with either PBMs or health plans directly to get a drug 
favorably on a formulary.  These contracts are confidential; since the confidentiality 
keeps the true price hidden from competing health plans.  In the contracts, drug 
companies often offer monetary incentives to health plans for favorable placement of the 
drug.  These incentives include rebates, discounts, and chargebacks that kick money back 
to the health plan after a prescription is filled.  As expected, one must question any 
analysis involving drug prices in the US on whether the price used reflects the true price 
net of rebates, discounts, and chargebacks; the true price is known as Average Selling 
Price (ASP).  Given this concern, the cancer drug market was targeted because there is 
research that suggests rebates, discounts, and chargebacks are not significant in the 
cancer drug market due to the significant market power of drug companies.36 
 Another reason for the focus of research on cancer drugs is related to the 
indications.  Since this study explores the role of indication on cancer drug pricing and 
possible price discrimination, it is important to determine a clear indication.  For many 
drugs, there is always the potential of off-label use; off-label describes the situation 
where the drug is prescribed for an indication that is not marketed or approved for.  
Cancer drugs are rarely used off-label, therefore, the indications for the drug are truly 
reflective of actual indications, and this allows for better analysis on the association of 
price discrimination to cancer type. 
                                                          
35 Berndt, E. R., McGuire, T. G., & Newhouse, J. P. (2011). 
36 Danzon, P. M., & Taylor, E. (2010).  
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Lastly, the choice of high-cost cancer drugs is due to the concern of policy 
makers, physicians, and patients.37  It has been reported that high costs for cancer drugs, 
even just the deductibles and co-pay paid by patients, is associated with lower adherence 
to medication38, and adherence is critical for proper cancer care.39  Not only does the high 
cost of cancer drugs act as a barrier to treatment, but it may substantially impact a 
patient’s or his/her family’s life including exhaustion of savings and personal 
bankruptcy.40  In the presence of price discrimination, drugs can be priced above the 
normal competitive equilibrium meaning higher cost sharing which reduces adherence. 
This thesis studies price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  It begins 
with a discussion of current literature, which provides the foundation for a conceptual 
model.  Evidence for price discrimination is empirically analyzed.  This analysis also 
examines the associations illustrated in the conceptual model.  In the last chapter, trends 
in the US cancer drug market are examined, followed by an assessment of the impact of 
price discrimination in the US market.   
Throughout this thesis, the results will be discussed with a focus on policy 
implications.  Many results will be suggestive of the imperfect competition in the US 
cancer drug market.  These results will add further evidence of imperfect competition in 
the US cancer drug market and raise concerns for market abuses (setting and increasing 
prices without credible explanation).  The differential pricing associated with price 
                                                          
37 Zafar, S. Y. (2016). 
38 Eaddy, M. T., Cook, C. L., O’Day, K., Burch, S. P., & Cantrell, C. R. (2012). 
39 Ruddy, K., Mayer, E., & Partridge, A. (2009).  




discrimination also raises concerns for policymakers for issues of access, fairness, and 
equity in the US cancer drug market.  
1.1 Research Methods 
 The overarching goal of the thesis is to better understand price discrimination in 
the US cancer drug market.  Chapter 2 comprises a structured literature review and 
development of conceptual model explaining demand factors and price discrimination in 
the US cancer drug market.  In Chapter 3, empirical analysis assesses evidence for price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market and examines several of the hypothesized 
associations that were depicted in the conceptual model.  Chapter 3 introduces the 
primary database for the study which is the Truven Health MarketScan® Research 
Database (MarketScan®) from 2010 to 2014, supplemented with Truven Health Red 
Book®.  Chapter 4 builds upon the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 by quantifying the 
price trends in the US cancer drug market.  The price trends analysis sets the stage for 
analysis of the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market, and four 
related but distinct secondary hypotheses are examined. 
 Each chapter has its own primary and secondary hypotheses that are related to 
price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  In Chapter 2, the primary hypothesis 
is that price discrimination in the US cancer drug market can be explained visually by 
showing the associations between the five key actors (patients, payers, physicians, drug 
manufacturers, and government) of the US cancer drug market and price discrimination.  
The nature and type of associations were derived from a structured literature review 
targeting articles in the health and economics literature.  The literature search used nine 
concepts to identify relevant articles: pharmaceutical price discrimination; 
14 
 
pharmaceutical market power; market power and price discrimination; health plan 
characteristics and demand for pharmaceuticals; pharmaceutical characteristics and 
demand; physician characteristics and demand for pharmaceuticals; patient characteristics 
and demand for pharmaceuticals; health policy and demand for pharmaceuticals; and 
pricing in the cancer drug market.  A total of 1472 articles were found.  These articles’ 
abstracts were screened for relevance to some aspect of price discrimination in the US 
cancer drug market.  After abstract screening, a total of 106 articles were deemed relevant 
to the study.  A review of these articles motivated the associations between the five key 
actors of the US cancer drug market and price discrimination.  These associations were 
depicted as a conceptual model.  The model was tested empirically in subsequent 
chapters.  
In Chapter 3, the primary hypothesis is that a market with imperfect competition 
will exhibit increasing levels of price dispersion as the market gets more competitive if 
price discrimination is present.  The hypothesis was motivated by theoretical work from 
Borenstein41 and Holmes42.  Their work suggested price discrimination can occur in 
markets with imperfect competition, which neither have true monopolies nor do they 
have perfectly competition.  Specifically, price discrimination can exist in imperfect 
markets if products (and companies) have market power, products that are differentiable, 
and have cross-price elasticities.  The hypothesis is the price dispersion differences would 
exist between the two environments in presence of price discrimination exists and 
dispersion would be greater in the multi-source environment.  This hypothesis was tested 
                                                          
41 Borenstein, S. (1985). Price discrimination in free-entry markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 380-
397. 
42 Holmes, T. J. (1989). The effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. The American 
Economic Review, 79(1), 244-250. 
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using multi-level regression analysis using five different models stratified by single 
source and multi-source cancer drugs for a total of ten different regression analyses.  In 
addition, Chapter 3 has several secondary hypotheses related to the demand factors and 
price discrimination.  The demand factors were suggested in Chapter 2’s conceptual 
model.  These hypotheses posited an association between demand factors and price 
dispersion.  Multi-level regression analysis is conducted for the secondary hypothesis 
analysis.  The demand factors of interest include: 
1. Health plan type (e.g. high deductible health plan or health maintenance 
organization) 
2. Health plan market share 
3. Patient characteristics including age, sex, employee classification 
4. Drug characteristics including overall survival and years since FDA approval 
Chapter 3 also presents results from a univariate analysis comparing the demand 
factors listed above as well as cancer diagnoses of patients with levels of price discount 
and price dispersion.  Similar to the regression models above, the univariate analysis was 
stratified by single source and multi-source cancer drugs.   
Economists judge the merits of price discrimination on the change in welfare, and 
suggest price discrimination is beneficial if it increases welfare.  They also generally 
posit that an increase in output is associated with more social welfare.  For policy makers, 
the major concern is access to the drugs.  Access and output is considered to be positively 
related.  Chapter 4 uses longitudinal data to quantify pricing trends of US cancer drug 
market and assesses the relationship between price discrimination and access.  The prices 
for antineoplastic agents therapeutic class drugs in a large commercial claims database 
16 
 
from 2010-2014 are analyzed.  The trends in the US cancer drug market provides the data 
to assess the impact of price discrimination on utilization.   
The primary hypothesis is an increase in price dispersion for a cancer drug, proxy for 
price discrimination, is associated with an increase in cancer drug utilization.  Using the 
price trend and utilization data from 2010-2015, this hypothesis was tested with a linear 
mixed methods regression model with random effects and cluster variable around drug.  
This model estimated the association of changes to price dispersion with changes to 
cancer drug utilization while controlling for market factors including changes to price 
level, changes in manufacturers, and changes in discounts between transaction price and 
AWP.  In addition to the primary hypothesis, Chapter 4 also tested four secondary 
hypotheses.  These are: 
1. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentile price paid for a drug will increase.   
2. Health plans with capitation will see slower rates of price increases. 
3. Following the transition from branded to generic drugs, cancer drugs will lower 
their prices, have greater dispersion, and increased use.  
4. For generic cancer drugs, an increase in number of participating manufacturers 
will be associated with lower prices, higher dispersion, and increased utilization. 
The secondary hypotheses were assessed using a variety of methods.  These include 
univariate analysis on price trends, regression analysis, and graphical analysis.  For the 
first hypotheses, univariate analysis and graphical analysis confirms a growing gap in 
prices paid. For the second hypotheses, univariate analysis suggests plans with capitation 
saw smaller increase as a price relative to plans with capitation.  However, a t-test finds 
no statistical significance of this result.  For the third hypothesis, there were four branded 
17 
 
cancer drugs that had entry of generic competition during the study sample.  These four 
were exemestane (generic approved April 201143), anastrozole (generic approved June 
201044), letrozole (generic approved June 201145), and capecitabine (generic approved 
September 201346).  Changes in utilization, price, and price dispersion were assessed for 
these for drugs.  For the fourth hypothesis, the regression models from the primary 
hypotheses were adapted to test changes in the number of unique manufacturers. This 
hypothesis was tested strictly in the multi-source drug sample since single source drugs 
had only one manufacturer by definition.  This thesis uses a variety of methods to 
examine price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.   
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1. Current literature on price discrimination in the drug market suggests price 
discrimination exists across countries, incomes, and indications. 
2. Structured literature review found 1472 articles, of these 106 articles were related 
to some aspect of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market and are 
discussed. 
3. A conceptual model relating the five key actors of the US cancer drug market and 





 Price differentials for drugs have been observed both internationally and within 
the US market.  The differential pricing coupled with a drug’s market power, ability to 
control the sale of the product, and ability to segment consumers based on their 
preferences suggest the potential for price discrimination.  The economics and health 
services research literature were synthesized to create a conceptual model identifying the 
motivations of the five principle actors of the pharmaceutical market (health plans, 
patients, physicians, drug companies, and the government) and their potential influence 
on price discrimination.  The model suggests that the four largest associations between 
the principle actors and price discrimination are: 1) the ability to pharmaceutical firms to 
segment the market and engage in price discrimination, 2) the ability of pharmaceutical 
firms to have market power and engage in price discrimination, 3) how health plan 
characteristics can contribute to market segmentation, and 4) how drug characteristics 
influence the level of price discrimination. This model will be tested empirically in 





There is an extensive research literature on price discrimination in the 
pharmaceutical market. Most of the literature involves international price differentials.  
The research literature contains studies examining the price variation across countries,47 
price variation by indication,48 and price variation associated with income.49  The 
international level of price variation can be significant, Danzon and Furukawa found that 
drug prices seven developed countries are on average approximately 6-33% lower than 
the prices paid in the US50; other researchers have found even greater variation.51  While 
some policy makers have found problems with price discrimination domestically, the 
World Health Organization has embraced pharmaceutical price differentiation as a way to 
increase access for developing nations.52 In this paper, we will focus our attention on 
price discrimination domestically and more specifically focus on price discrimination in 
the cancer drug market. 
The ability for a pharmaceutical company to charge different prices for the same 
product across different consumers is called “price discrimination” or “price 
differentiation”53.  For firms to price discriminate, economists have identified three 
necessary conditions.54   
1. A firm must be able to act as a price setter 
                                                          
47 Danzon, P. M., & Chao, L. W. (2000). 
48 Baslevent, C. (2005).  
49 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
50 Danzon, P. M., & Furukawa, M. F. (2003).  
51 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
52 World Health Organization. (2008). Measuring medicine prices, availability, affordability and price 
components. 
53 This paper will use price discrimination. 
54 Varian, H. R. (1989). Price discrimination. 
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2. A firm must be able to control the sale of its product 
3. A firm must be able to segment consumers by their demand (different demand 
elasticities for a drug). 
 The first condition is that the pharmaceutical company must be able to act as a 
price setter.  Economists define price setters as firms that are powerful enough to set the 
price they charge in a market as opposed to price takers who take the price the market 
sets (intersection of the supply and demand curve).  A key characteristic for price setters 
is the individual firms demand curve is downward sloping and resembles the aggregate 
market demand curve, as opposed to a price-taker who faces a horizontal demand curve.  
The price-taker’s demand curve is horizontal because the market (producers and 
consumers) has established a market clearing price for the product.  Branded drug 
companies are able to act as price setters because of market protections and the imperfect 
nature of the US drug market.  For branded drugs, patent protection and market 
exclusivity are the main instruments that allow a pharmaceutical company to price set, 
since these protections prevents competitors from copying the drug and entering the 
market.  For generic drugs, drug companies have some market power because of the 
imperfect nature of the market notably the barriers to entry due to regulatory hurdles for 
generics.55  
The second condition required for price discrimination is that a drug company can 
control the sale of its pharmaceuticals.  This condition is met because of legal and 
regulatory constraints within the pharmaceutical market.  US law regulates the reselling 
of pharmaceuticals such that sales are often strictly limited between the wholesaler and 
                                                          
55 Wiske, C. P., Ogbechie, O. A., & Schulman, K. A. (2015).  
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pharmaceutical manufacturers.56  Specific to the US, a key law limiting arbitrage of 
pharmaceuticals is the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of 1987.  This law 
limits the resale of drugs to wholesalers, stipulates wholesale regulations, and further 
directs state governments to regulate wholesalers.57  The PDMA also prevents re-
importation of pharmaceuticals; therefore, preventing trans-geographic market 
transactions.  In addition, contracts between insurer and suppliers (pharmaceutical 
manufacturers or wholesalers) prevent health insurers from purchasing pharmaceuticals 
at a negotiated price and then reselling the pharmaceuticals to other health insurers.58   
The third condition is that the drug company must be able to segment the market 
based on consumers’ heterogeneous utilities for the drug (different demand elasticities).  
Patients may have different demand elasticities for a drug, because 1) patients may value 
the attributes of the drug differently; 2) the effectiveness of the drug can depend on 
specific patient characteristics; and 3) patients have different income levels.59   
We also note that different demand elasticities can also apply to different public 
and private payers.60  Intuitively, a payer’s demand elasticity is going to be driven by the 
payer’s budget constraint and ability to shift patient demand to other products.  Danzon61 
and Frank62 both suggest the price differential across US payers is related to the payers’ 
demand elasticity.  Within the commercially insured market, evidence of different 
demand elasticities is suggested by the different formularies, and comparison of spending 
                                                          
56 Berndt, E. R., & Newhouse, J. P. (2010).  
57 Angarola, R. T., & Beach, J. E. (1996).  
58 Frank, R. G. (2001). 
59 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
60 Frank, R. G. (2001). 
61 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
62 Frank, R. G. (2001). 
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and utilizations across plan types.63 64 In the public sector, it is typically constrained by 
budget allocations. 
Economists commonly judge the merits of price discrimination by the impact on 
social welfare.  Welfare is a measurement of the utility a particular good or service 
provides and typically measured in currency units.65  In general, economists assume that 
if price discrimination increases output, then it increases welfare.66  Many health 
economists have argued that price discrimination for pharmaceuticals allows companies 
to enter markets that would normally not be served in a uniform pricing environment. 67 68 
69  Since entering new markets increases output without necessarily sacrificing output in 
other markets, then price discrimination of pharmaceuticals is deemed beneficial to 
society.   
While economists may embrace price discrimination if it increases output, policy 
makers may take a different perspective on the topic. The policy makers’ main concern is 
typically access, and access is not the same as welfare. Economists measure welfare as an 
area effect (price multiplied by quantity), while access is measured by determining if the 
right medications are getting to the right patients.  The difference in measurement can 
create different judgments on the value of price discrimination when companies price 
discriminate across different consumer segments.   
                                                          
63 Hillman, A. L., Pauly, M. V., Escarce, J. J., Ripley, K., Gaynor, M., Clouse, J., & Ross, R. (1999). 
64 Joyce, G. F., Escarce, J. J., Solomon, M. D., & Goldman, D. P. (2002).  
65 Arrow, K. (1962). 
66 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
67 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
68 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
69 Malueg, D. A., & Schwartz, M. (1994).  
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For example, consider the use of differential pricing that allows a drug to be 
favorably placed on different health plan formularies.  In this situation, within each 
consumer segment (health plan) a profit-maximizing drug company may set the drug 
price as close to each plan’s maximum reserve price.  These prices may be at such a high 
level that access is impeded either through affordability of the patient or formulary 
controls.  Besides access, another major consideration for policy makers is that of 
fairness and equity across different patient groups.  For the commercially insured market 
of the US, most people are insured through employers and have very limited choice in 
health plans.  For enrollees, this may mean that prices paid and ultimately premiums and 
cost sharing are choices out of their direct control.  In the case of Type II price 
discrimination, in which prices reflect quantity purchased, large health plans can access 
lower prices; and in the case of Type III price discrimination, in which prices reflect 
consumer groups’ demand elasticity, a capitated plan may be more aggressive in 
obtaining lower prices than a high-deductible plan.  In either case, an enrollee’s access to 
lower or higher drug prices is affected by the health plan’s size or plan type; some 
enrollees will benefit, others will lose. 
For both policy makers and researchers, understanding price discrimination in the 
US cancer drug market requires a conceptual framework.  The basis of the conceptual 
framework will be an assessment of the five major actors70 in the pricing and 
reimbursement of the US cancer drug market, and how these actors relate to the price 
discrimination.  These five factors are drug companies, patients, physicians, public and 
private payers, and the government (regulatory environment).   
                                                          
70 Berndt, E. R., McGuire, T. G., & Newhouse, J. P. (2011).  
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It is important to note that some actors in the supply chain are missing from the 
model, and this is due to the focus of the conceptual model on price discrimination of 
cancer drugs. In this model, Pharmacy Benefit Mangers (PBMs) are assumed to be an 
extension of a health plans’ drug demand. In addition, wholesalers are assumed to be a 
pass-through entity having minimal demand effect.  While the five main actors have 
distinct motivations, they have close interactions and the nature of these relationships will 
be depicted in the conceptual model.  For example, a health plan’s (payer) cost-sharing 
directly influences a patient demand for drugs, but the level of cost-sharing could also be 
associated with a patient’s choice of which drug plan to select.  These five main actors 
form the basis for the literature review. 
This paper will discuss existing literature on price discrimination in the drug 
market with an emphasis on factors hypothesized to be associated with price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market; present a conceptual model relating these 
factors and price discrimination; and discuss which factors may be most important and 
relevant to policy makers. 
 
2.3 Methods 
 The study develops a conceptual model that explains demand factors and price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  The conceptual model will be structured to 
show relationships between the five main actors in the US drug market and price 
discrimination of cancer drugs.  The literature review was undertaken with a goal of 
identifying where researchers agreed, disagreed, and where more research was needed in 
26 
 
the relationship between demand factors and price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market. 
 A structured literature review was conducted in July 2016 to identify English-
language articles related to price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  The 
approach was first to identify articles discussing price discrimination in pharmaceuticals 
generally.  Identifying articles discussing factors associated with market power and 
demand for pharmaceuticals followed this initial analysis.  Lastly, articles discussing 
pricing in cancer drug market were identified.  This approach provided the basis for 
identifying associations between key actors in the drug market, a drug’s market power, 
and firm’s ability to price discriminate, and tailoring these associations to the US cancer 
drug market.   
 The literature search used two electronic databases: PubMed and EconLit.  These 
databases were chosen because they included the main articles from the fields of health 
sciences and economics; both of which could contribute research articles related to price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  The literature search used nine concepts to 
identify relevant articles: pharmaceutical price discrimination; pharmaceutical market 
power; market power and price discrimination; health plan characteristics and demand for 
pharmaceuticals; pharmaceutical characteristics and demand; physician characteristics 
and demand for pharmaceuticals; patient characteristics and demand for pharmaceuticals; 
health policy and demand for pharmaceuticals; and pricing in the cancer drug market.  
The first eight concepts were used to capture relevant articles to a broader drug market 
beyond just cancer drugs, while the ninth focused on the cancer drug market.  Specific 
key words and the search algorithm are shown in the Appendix.   
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Inclusion criteria for initial selection were that the paper contained any of the 
possible combinations of key terms and published in a peer-reviewed journal.  Both 
searches were conducted in July 2016.  The results were initially screened to remove 
duplicative articles and non-English articles.  The screening was followed by a review of 
the title and abstract to identify articles that were relevant to price discrimination in the 
drug market.  Articles were deemed relevant if they discussed price discrimination or 
price dispersion in the pharmaceutical markets.  These articles were further classified as 
to whether they pertain to price discrimination or demand factors affecting market 
power/price discrimination.   Additionally, the ninth search concept captured articles on 
the pricing in the US cancer drug market since the conceptual model will be tailored to 
this market.  Articles were then classified as US or international based on the article 
focus.  Figure 1 is a flow chart of the literature review. 
 After the identification of relevant articles, these articles were read and reviewed 
in the preparation of developing a conceptual model explaining price discrimination in 
the US cancer drug market.  Articles were ultimately selected based on the following 
subjective criteria.  First, they were selected if they explicitly discussed price 
discrimination in the pharmaceutical market.  Second, they were selected if they 
discussed one of the key market actors (physicians, payers, patients, drug companies, or 
government) and demand for pharmaceuticals either in US or international markets; and 
the article’s results could be applied to the US drug market.  Third, they focused on 
pricing of cancer drugs. 
Examples of the types of included articles are ones discussing the role of generic 
entry on branded drug demand, the impact of cost sharing on drug demand, and the 
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impact of physician characteristics on drug demand.  Examples of excluded articles are 
ones discussing the impact of United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence on specific drug availability and the role of foundation aid on antiretroviral 
drugs in the developing world. Neither of which are applicable to the US drug market.  A 
third criterion was used to select relevant articles on pricing of cancer drugs, emphasizing 
the factors associated with cancer drug prices in the US.  This criterion was motivated by 
the fact that the conceptual model was being designed to study the US cancer drug 
market, and articles on pricing of cancer drugs helped facilitate the tailoring of more 
general drug market articles to the US cancer drug market. 
 From the selected articles, the associations between the key actors of the drug 
market and price discrimination were identified and interpreted for the conceptual model.  
The results section presents overall literature review results. There is a brief section 
discussing articles focusing in the international context. This is followed by a discussion 
of articles focusing on the associations within the US drug market. And finally, the 
pricing of US cancer drugs is discussed, with elaborations on how pricing of US cancer 
drugs would be affected by the general model. Areas of agreement, disagreement, and 
need for further research were highlighted. 
 
2.4 Results 
The literature review provided a landscape of demand factors that affected price 
discrimination in the drug market.  Initially, the PubMed search resulted in 1279 articles 
and the EconLit search resulted in 581 for a combined total of 1860 across the nine 
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concepts.  Duplications both across the nine concepts and two databases found 283 
duplicate articles.  Exclusion of non-English language articles removed another 105 
results.  
 Of the remaining 1472 articles, 106 articles were deemed relevant to price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  During the review of the abstracts, there 
were several reasons for exclusion of the 1366 articles.  Many articles were identified in 
the search but were excluded during the screening process because the article focused on 
a specific drug’s biological use.  This was common in the PubMed search results.  Other 
articles that were excluded were articles discussing “drugs” and another search term, but 
these articles were not discussing pharmaceuticals rather another type of drug such as 
illicit drugs or veterinary medications.  The last common reason for exclusion was that an 
article discussed one of the five key actors and drug prices but did not discuss the 
relationship between the actor and drug demand.  106 articles were ultimately deemed 
relevant to price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  74 of these 106 primarily 
discussed research in primarily the US market while 32 primarily discussed research 
primarily in the international market.  26 articles specifically addressed price 
discrimination and/or forms of price dispersion of drug prices, of which15 focused on 
international price discrimination/dispersion.  23 articles discussed cancer drug prices, 
with 20 focused on US cancer drug market.  The other 57 articles discussed demand 
factors and market power/price discrimination.  The majority of these were US focused 
(43).   
 The results of the literature review provide a framework for developing 
hypotheses for the relationships between patients, payers, physicians, and drug 
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characteristics on both market power and price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market.  These relationships are discussed in the context of international, US, and finally 
the cancer drug market. 
2.4.1 Price Discrimination in the International Drug Market  
The literature review aimed to create a conceptual model relating the key actors to 
price discrimination in the US cancer drug market. However, many of the articles were in 
the context of international drug markets: either explicitly discussing price discrimination 
across countries or discussing demand factors of drugs based on ex-US research.  
However, this literature has implications on a US cancer drug market conceptual model 
and will be briefly summarized. 
Many articles discussed price discrimination of pharmaceuticals across different 
countries. 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83  These articles highlight some of the reason for 
price discrimination and the factors associated with price differentials.  All the articles 
agree that price differences exist and these differentials were in fact price discrimination.  
However, one article by Schmalenesee argues that some difference in international prices 
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could be attributable to price regimes and not solely price discrimination. 84  For these 
articles, relevancy for the conceptual model of price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market is addressed by inquiring what factors are associated with price differentials and if 
these factors are applicable to the US cancer drug market. 
 The first major conclusion from the international literature is price discrimination 
of pharmaceuticals is in part due to the pharmaceutical cost structure and subsequent 
market protection.  For branded pharmaceuticals, there is significant upfront/fixed costs 
in the form of research and development expense related to developing a new drug.85 86  
In economics, this is sometimes referred to as “sunk costs.” The pharmaceutical 
companies are given incentives to accept this large and upfront expense by the 
government giving them market protections, i.e. patenting and market exclusivities, for 
newly launched drugs.  These market protections provide a drug company significant 
market power (and satisfy the 1st necessary condition of price discrimination) since other 
companies cannot create a bioequivalent competitor.  For the conceptual model, this 
suggests a strong association between market power and price discrimination.  It also 
suggests a link between a drug’s market protection status and market power.   
 Other conclusions from the international literature on price discrimination relate 
to the factors associated with price discrimination, and how these factors relate to a 
conceptual model of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  Several articles 
examined the price differentials.87 88 89 90 91 92  Many authors have noted that the level of 
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price differential is related in part to a country’s income, often measured by GDP, since 
income has an impact on demand.93 94 95  For example, Lichtenberg found a highly 
significant positive correlation between per capita income and the drug price index.96  
The relationship between income and demand is an example of the “income effect”.   
The income effect underpins an explanatory association of price differentials 
across health plans in the US, when one considers a health plans premiums to be 
associated with income.  This will be revisited when discussing price discrimination in 
the US market.  A few articles also discussed international regulations on price 
differentials especially noting the relationship between branded and generic drug prices.  
Danzon and Chao (2000) research suggests in less regulated environments, generics have 
a lower price. 97  When price differentials exist for generic drugs, this suggests that the 
generic market is not perfectly competitive and supports the notion that the market is 
imperfect.  In a perfectly competitive market, the drug firm faces a price equal to 
marginal cost, and for drugs the marginal costs tend to be very low.98  One would not 
expect significant differences in marginal costs across countries for generics.  The 
suggestion that the generic drug market is not perfectly competitive will be a crucial 
assumption in Paper 2 analyses, and will be further explored. 
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  Another area of international research assessed the impact of competition on 
price differentials.  First, the finding that generic competition is inversely related to price, 
suggests that generic competition weakens market power. 99   Second, within the broad 
branded market, the level of competition, measured by number of drugs within the 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification system, was not statistically associated 
with price differences. Danzon and Chao reasoned that branded drug competition would 
only have an effect on price in therapeutically crowded classes.100  These results highlight 
an important difference between generic and branded drugs.  Generic drugs can have 
true, bioequivalent competitors from another generic drug manufacturer; however, 
branded drugs do not have a bioequivalent competitor, but rather can have therapeutic 
substitutes, and the competitive closeness of therapeutic substitutes can vary by drug and 
class.  This is an important point to include in the conceptual model. It is necessary to 
examine the characteristics of the specific therapeutic class, the relevant cancer drugs, 
and the alternatives to drug treatment such as radiation. The level of competition among 
drugs within the same treatment modality and alternatives to drugs could affect market 
power and are depicted in the conceptual model.    
 The international results also included articles that examined drug demand within 
a country and found results applicable to the conceptual model for cancer drugs. Filippini 
et al101 and Dalen102 et al found that patient age is positively associated with the choice of 
brand over generic drugs. The conceptual model will link patient age to market power; 
however, it will be assumed to be a weak association since we assume the primary 
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consumer is the health plan in the US cancer drug market.  Filippini et al also found a 
relationship between patients’ income and demand for drugs.  Similar to patient age, this 
is assumed to be a weak association in the model because the effect is recognized by the 
choice of health plan.  Health plans are the entity that chooses the formulary and the 
entity that negotiates the price. The role of the patient is to choose the health plan.  
International research has also shown that the physician age103 104 and physician 
density105 are both associated with drug demand.  Physician characteristics will be noted 
in the conceptual model, but similar to patient age, the association is assumed to be weak.  
The physician’s characteristics will not be empirically tested in paper two due to lack of 
data on the prescriber.   
 The international results of the literature review are important; however, their 
ability to translate to the US cancer market requires caution.  There are significant 
cultural, regulatory, and market dynamic differences between the US and other OECD 
countries. 
2.4.2 Price Discrimination in the US Drug Market 
The literature review yielded 54 articles relevant to price discrimination in the US drug 
market.  Among the 54 articles, 11 discussed price discrimination in the US drug market 
while 43 discussed demand factors. 
 For the 11 articles that discussed price discrimination the US drug market, there 
were two main themes.  The first theme was a recognition and discussion of price 
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discrimination in the US drug market.  Some of these articles provide the explanation 
behind the price discrimination the US drug market in the framework of the three 
necessary conditions for price discrimination.  It was generally agreed that the US drug 
market is imperfect thereby providing considerable market power for drug companies.  
There is also agreement that the US drug market is highly regulated limiting arbitrage and 
resale of drugs and there are significant differences across consumer segments.  
Specifically, Berndt and Newhouse argue that price discrimination, specifically Type III, 
is highly prevalent in the branded and less so in the generic drug market.106  They point to 
the low price paid by VA and Medicaid, slightly higher prices paid by health 
maintenance organizations, even higher prices at tiered third-party payers depending on 
formularies, and highest prices for cash buyers is evidence of Type III price 
discrimination.  Frank107 and Lichtenberg108 noted similar pattern.  These results suggest 
a relationship between health plan and price discrimination.   
Researchers also agree that market power of the company drives price 
discrimination.  An example of market power and consumer segmentation in the US was 
Baslevant’s article on finasteride.109  Finasteride is the molecule in both Proscar® and 
Propecia®, just in slightly different quantities. Baslevant noted that while both drugs are 
using the same drug molecular compound, the drug Propecia® for the treatment of hair 
loss was priced significantly higher than Proscar® which treats enlarged prostrates.  The 
fact that the drug is the same molecule manufactured by the same company and can be 
branded for two different indications and charged two different prices suggest a clear cut 
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example of price discrimination.  However, finasteride is a unique example since it was 
branded twice, but the relationship between target indication and price is nonetheless 
important to note.  Theoretically, assuming branded drugs are more monopolistic than 
freely competitive, the price premium over marginal cost is greater the less elastic the 
demand. 110  If elasticity were related to indication, then indication would be related to the 
market power and price discrimination.   
  Silver raised concern over Type III price discrimination for macular 
degeneration within the Medicare program. 111    He reported on the controversy of 
bevacizumab and its antibody fragment, ranibizumab.  Both drugs work equally well in 
macular degeneration, but ranibizumab was marketed specifically for the condition and 
cost 40x the price of bevacizumab.  Again, suggesting indication is related to pricing and 
price discrimination. There were a few articles that discuss price discrimination in the US 
primarily in a legal context.112 113 114  The Robinson-Patman Act states discriminatory 
pricing is illegal under certain conditions notably price discrimination causes competitive 
injury.  During the 1990s, retail pharmacies sued drug manufacturers alleging drug 
manufacturers offered discounts to managed care organizations but not retail pharmacies, 
which in essence is price discrimination since managed care organizations would 
ultimately pay less than retail pharmacies.  This case was ultimately settled.  Pertinent to 
the conceptual model, these articles further suggest Type III price discrimination occurs.   
2.4.3 Demand Factors in the US Drug Market 
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Two conditions for price discrimination have been central in the literature on 
demand factors and price discrimination.  First, a firm must be a price setter. This means 
it has to have market power to price discriminate, something that is exacerbated in the US 
drug market due to underlying imperfections.115  These imperfections include barriers to 
entry (it is very expensive to develop a new drug and regulatory hurdles), agency 
(physicians acting in both their own economic interest and the patient’s interest), and 
asymmetric information (patients have difficulty assessing the value of a drug).  It is 
important to understand how a firm can be a price setter and whether certain factors 
exacerbate market power that would need to be monitored by policy makers.  Second, a 
firm must be able to segment the market by different demand elasticities, especially for 
type III price discrimination in which a firm price discriminates by consumer groups.  In 
an imperfect market, prices are set above the competitive equilibrium and the margin is 
associated with demand elasticities; both the Ramsey Optimal Price (ROP) Model116 and 
Lerner Mark-up are based on elasticities of demand and have been used in drug 
markets.117  These pricing models have been used to explain the high price of branded 
drugs where prices far exceed marginal costs; and these models are applicable in markets 
that are neither monopolies nor perfectly competitive.  Therefore, the ability and level of 
price discrimination is best understood if one understands the demand factors that 
influence demand elasticities. 
 For drug company characteristics, the articles primarily centered on drug 
characteristics and their demand effects.  The results can be broken into research on the 
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relationship between branded versus generic drugs in terms of both substitutability and 
price, and determinants of demand.  Regarding brand versus generic drugs, many authors 
commented on factors for substitutability.  There is general agreement that the driving 
factor for substitutability is own price elasticities for a branded drug and cross price 
elasticities for generics. 118  119  These elasticities are driven by demand determinants 
between branded and generic notably price levels, 120 121 122 amount of side effects, 123 
brand-loyalty, 124 and marketing. 125   
Related to the relationship between branded and generics, some research looked at 
branded price in response to generic entry.  While there was no consensus across studies 
on a uniform price effect on branded from generic entry, Kong suggested branded drugs’ 
price may rise in face of generic entry into the therapeutic class if the branded drug is on 
formulary of high coverage insurers and the factor of cross-substitute between branded 
and generic is small. 126  Additionally, Berndt et al suggest marketing and side effect 
profiles could have a positive relationship to brand price when generics are available. 127  
An important gap in the literature is the role of drug characteristics such as therapeutic 
benefit and price change over time, when not considering generic entry.  The literature 
review found few articles discussing solely the demand for a drug based on drug 
characteristics, but relationships primarily researched the interaction between branded 
and generic drugs.   
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 Another major actor is the payer; this is the health plan/health insurer.  In the US, 
the payer may be either commercial or government.  The literature on the payer and 
demand for drugs falls into two spheres.  One body of research examines the role of 
insurance, type of insurance, and having no insurance on the demand for drugs.  The 
other body of research dives into the details of coverage and examines the role of 
formularies and cost sharing on drug demand.   
 Unsurprisingly, there was consensus that insurance increased drug utilization.128 
129 130 131  Research looked at both the issuance of coverage and major changes of 
coverage (e.g. filling Medicare Part D “donut” hole).  While insurance increased 
utilization, some authors found it to have a more modest effect on utilization than 
expected. 132 133  Other notable results include a negative price response to insurance134, 
and less price elasticity to drugs targeting chronic or life-threatening conditions. 135 This 
last point is important to examine the relationship between type of cancer and associated 
mortality and drug price.  The “modest” change to utilization based on insurance 
identifies a possible a gap in the research since these articles used older data when high 
cost specialty drugs were not prevalent.  
 Examining the role of formularies and cost sharing, researchers broadly agree on 
a negative relationship between restrictions (either formulary controls or increased cost 
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sharing) and drug utilization. 136 137 138 139  There were no immediate areas of 
disagreement, but there were some applicable takeaways from individual studies.  
Sheingold and Nguyen find an inverse relationship between cost sharing and generic 
utilization although the association was strongest in more competitive classes.140  Gilman 
et al suggests increased cost sharing have less of an impact on maintenance medications 
due to more inelastic demand.141  Both results could impact either the cross price 
elasticities or own price elasticities of cancer drugs under different cost sharing regimes 
and clinical effectiveness of a drug. 
 The role of patient characteristics on cancer drug demand is minimal because the 
demand for pharmaceuticals is a derived demand.  First, they are not the person ordering 
the drug – physicians are the person legally able to order the drug. Second, with the 
exception of cases where direct to consumer drug advertising works, most patients do not 
demand specific drugs, rather they demand improved health, and the physician acts as the 
agent in determining the drug.  This means that the patient will be very concerned on the 
pharmaceutical’s impact on his or her health including therapeutic benefit and side 
effects, and underlying characteristics can influence demand for health.  Third, patients 
are often partially insulated from the true cost of pharmaceuticals due to the role of 
insurance.  Finally, and perhaps the most important, the health plan not the patient 
determines the formulary and negotiates the price. 
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Recognizing these constraints, the patient still plays an important role. The patient 
needs to fill the prescribed drug. Patient demand for specific drugs is recognized as 
having some role (e.g. the direct to consumer advertising).  Previously discussed 
literature has touched upon certain patient characteristics and drug demand.  Income142 
and condition143 could both effect patient demand.144  These studies recognize significant 
variation in medication utilization and suggest part of this variation is attributable to 
unobserved patient characteristics.  Understanding how unobserved patient characteristics 
affect within drug utilization is a gap in the literature that could better explain drug 
demand. 
 While the patient is the consumer of the drug, it is the physician that prescribes 
the drug and therefore has a strong influence on demand for the drug.  The literature on 
the physician’s role for demanding a drug follows two main themes: modifiable physician 
behavior and physician characteristics.  Modifiable physician behavior research focuses 
on the impact of marketing and pharmaceutical detailing to physicians and subsequent 
prescribing behavior.  Marketing is an important component to brand building, and Dalen 
et al found brand loyalty to be an important determinant in brand versus generic 
substitution since physicians do not have financial incentives to choose generic over 
branded drugs. 145  Likewise, Berndt et al found demand for antidepressants to be 
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influenced by marketing both directed to physicians and consumers. 146  More direct, 
Datta and Dave show physician detailing can change prescribing behavior.147   
While the conceptual model will indicate brand loyalty as a characteristic for both 
the patient and physician that influences drug demand, the age of the drug will be a proxy 
in the empirical analysis.  This proxy is based on the assumption that demand loyalty 
builds over time. 
 There is general agreement that marketing efforts and impact drug demand can 
influence physician prescribing behavior; however, it is also worth noting that marketing 
is exclusively the purview of branded drugs and not generics.  Beyond the role of 
marketing, researchers have found relationships between for physician geographic 
density and physician distance to patient on the prescribing patterns where both increased 
density and shorter distance increases the number of office visits and subsequently drug 
demand. 148 149 Age and sex of physician are also associated with prescribing patterns. 150  
However, limited prescriber data in commercial claims dataset used to test the conceptual 
model in paper 2 limits the ability to test these hypothesized associations.  While these 
latter characteristics are important in understanding a drug’s demand elasticity, the 
relationship between these characteristics and market power or price discrimination is 
unclear.   
 The last actor to be discussed is the government and their role in developing the 
regulatory environment for cancer drugs in the US.  For US policy environment, articles 
                                                          
146 Berndt, E. R., Bhattacharjya, A., Mishol, D. N., Arcelus, A., & Lasky, T. (2002). 
147 Datta, A., & Dave, D. (2016). 
148 Filippini, M., Masiero, G., & Moschetti, K. (2009). 
149 Cecil, W. T., Barnes, J., Shea, T., & Coulter, S. L. (2006). 
150 Pichetti, S., Sermet, C., Godman, B., Campbell, S. M., & Gustafsson, L. L. (2013). 
43 
 
that discussed the US pharmaceutical market highlighted the role of the FDA and the 
regulatory environment in restricting market entry,151 limiting drug resale (second 
condition for price discrimination), and fostering the imperfect competitive 
environment.152  For US cancer drug policy, the most relevant policy is statewide 
implementation of oral cancer drug parity laws.153  These laws seek to balance the 
financial incentives for a patient’s drug choice by allowing the out of pocket expense for 
oral cancer drugs, typically a prescription insurance benefit, fall in the same category as 
physician administered drugs, typically a medical benefit and which face out-of-pocket 
maximums.  Unfortunately, there is a dearth of research on empirical evidence for the 
impact of oral cancer parity laws on drug demand. 
 Eight of the search concepts focused on the drug market in general for while the 
ninth concept targeted the cancer drug market.  The results of the search had one 
overarching theme: many cancer drugs are very expensive.  Beyond this theme, research 
discussed two areas: trends in the cancer drug market and the value of cancer drugs.  For 
the trends in cancer drug market, the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) 
published research discussing increasing costs of cancer drugs, and the impact of costs on 
patient access.154 Bennett et al 155 showed that a lack of competitive pressure is a driving 
force behind higher cancer drug prices. Other research in trends in cancer drug market 
looked at international comparisons, 156 157 drawing similar conclusions as the price 
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dispersion literature.  Research on the trends of cancer drug prices was fairly consistent 
suggesting prices were increasing and not necessarily tied to improvements in a drug’s 
effectiveness; however, authors diverged on their opinions on what to do about the trend.  
 Researchers proposed a variety of methods to control cost including cost-
effectiveness, Medicare negotiation, and the use of evidence-based guidelines.  However 
much of these direct methods require an assessment of the value of the cancer drug; this 
is the second area of research.  Without going into the nuances of assessing value, most 
research supported a general cost effectiveness approach such that researchers can assign 
a dollar amount per effect.  Interestingly, there is some disagreement as to whether cancer 
is deserving of special treatment or not, with ASCO advocating for a special cancer 
framework and Brock arguing there is little ethical reason for unique framework.158  For 
the cancer market specific literature review, there are two main takeaways for the 
conceptual model.  First, there is no uniform assessment of value, although clinicians 
generally care most about survival as an effect.  Second, there is uncertainty concerning 
determining how the drugs are being used to treat specific cancers since drugs often 
target multiple indications and may be used as complements are not substitutes.  This last 
point suggests the relationship between competition and market power is relatively weak 
in the cancer drug market. 
2.5 Conceptual Model 
 The conceptual model begins with the identification of the five key actors in the 
US cancer drug market. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 2. In the conceptual 
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model figure, a subjective determination of the magnitude of the association is depicted 
by the relative size of the arrow.     
 The largest associations in terms of magnitude of impact are assumed to be the 
associations between market power of a drug and a drug company’s ability to price 
discriminate; the drug company’s ability to segment the market by health plan and their 
ability to price discriminate; the health plans’ differing demand elasticities and ability of 
drug companies to segment the health plans’ market; and drug attributes including 
branded and generic substitutability, indication, and market protections and these 
attributes contribution to market power.  The first two associations reflect two of the 
three necessary conditions for price discrimination.  The relationship between health plan 
and market segmentation is grounded in that the health plan is the primary consumer for 
cancer drugs.  It is necessary for drug companies to be able to segment the market based 
on health plans. The health plans could have different demand elasticities based on the 
general plan structure (i.e. HMO, HDHP) composition of plan enrollment, and cost-
sharing/formularies.  The health plan’s general structure and cost-sharing/formularies 
influences a plan’s budget constraint (i.e. income effect) and ability to guide patient’s 
drug utilization.  The composition of plan enrollment is associated with the aggregate of 
patient characteristics in a plan since different patients are likely to choose different plans 
based on their medical history, income and other factors.  Drug characteristics clearly 
influence market power based on the status of market protection i.e. patented versus 
generics, and side effect profile, relative effectiveness, and time on the market.  As noted 
earlier, the time on the market is used as a proxy for brand loyalty.   
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 The interpretation of the literature review suggests secondary associations include 
the associations between market power and market segmentation, patient characteristics 
and health plans, patient characteristics and market power, physician characteristics and 
market power, and government regulation and market power.  Market power and market 
segmentation are interconnected because firms need market power to segment the market.  
The market power for drug firms is driven both by the market protections for branded 
drugs and market imperfections for both branded and generic drugs.  Without market 
power, a firm would not be a price setter and cannot set differing prices to different 
market segments.  Patient characteristics and health plans were associated since patient 
characteristics could influence drug demand and is hypothesized that patient 
characteristics through the aggregation at the health plan level would influence a health 
plans drug demand.  Both physician characteristics and policy are loosely related to 
market power since they would affect the demand elasticity for cancer drugs.   
2.6 Limitations 
The study has several important limitations.  The results of the literature review 
may have missed important and relevant articles due to the databases searched or 
selection of keywords.  Many of the results were international or not specific to the US 
cancer market and their applicability to the conceptual model could be questioned.  The 
cancer drug market could be different from other drug markets.  The hypothesized 
relationships of the conceptual model were motivated by the literature review, but 
research results could have been misinterpreted.  Not only could the results be 
misinterpreted, but much of the literature only look a specific facet of the drug market 
and the interaction of other parts could have significantly altered the hypothesize 
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relationships.  Lastly, PBMs are assumed to be an extension of the health plan, but this 
structural assumption could be wrong.  Implications of which could fundamentally alter 
the relationship between health plans and market power and market segmentation and 
ultimately price discrimination. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Price differentials in the US drug market coupled with a drug’s market power, 
ability to control the sale of the product, and segment consumers based on their 
preferences suggest the potential for price discrimination.  A structured literature review 
provided research and suggestive hypotheses between the five key actors in the US 
cancer drug market and price discrimination.  The results of the literature review suggests 
that the four largest associations are: 
1. Ability to pharmaceutical firms to segment the market  
2. Ability of pharmaceutical firms to have market power  
3. How health plan characteristics can contribute to market segmentation 
4. How drug characteristics influence the level of price discrimination.   
These associations as well as others are modeled in the conceptual model in Figure 1, and 
will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters. For policymakers and researchers alike, 
the conceptual model provides an overview of factors that are hypothesized to be 
associated with price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  Policies that target 
key associations can influence market power and price discrimination.  Proactive policies 
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can be used to address issues on access, fairness and equity within the US cancer drug 
market.   
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2.8 APPENDIX CHAPTER 2 




Table 2.1: Literature Review Concept 
Concept Search Terms 
Price Discrimination 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND ((price 
discrimination) OR (price differentiat*) 
Market Power 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND (market 
power) 
Market Power and Price Discrimination 
(market power*)) AND ((price 
discrimination) OR (price differentiat*)) 
Health Plan Characteristics and Demand 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND (health 
plan) AND (health insur*) AND (demand) 
Drug Characteristics and Demand 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND 
((characteristic*) OR (attributes) or 
(characteristic*) AND (demand) 
Physician Characteristics and Demand 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND 
((characteristic*) OR (attributes)) AND  
(prescriber*) OR (doctor*) OR 
(physcian*)) AND (demand) 
Patient Characteristics and Demand 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND 
((characteristic*) OR (attributes)) AND  
(demand) AND (patient*) 
Policy and Demand 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND 
((characteristic*) OR (attributes)) AND  
(demand) AND (polic*) 
Cancer Drug Pricing 
(drug* OR pharmaceutical*) AND 
((cancer) OR (oncologic*)) AND  (pric*) 












ANALYSIS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE US 





1.   Within both the single source and multi-source competitive environment, there is 
evidence of Type 3 price discrimination, but no evidence of Type 2 price discrimination 
perhaps because we cannot determine the effect of PBMs. 
2.  Single source drugs have higher prices, lower relative and greater absolute price 
dispersion than multi-source drugs.   
3. Theory suggests in markets with imperfect competition, price discrimination will result 
in greater levels of price dispersion as the environment becomes more competitive up 
until firms no longer hold market power. We tested this theory for cancer drugs and 
found that the level of price dispersion is greater for multi-source drugs than for single 






This study examines the level and type of price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market.  Price discrimination is the ability of firms to charge different prices for the same 
product.  Using a large commercial claims database spanning five years, the differences 
between transaction price paid and the average wholesale price (AWP) and variation in 
prices were examined.  Based on theories of imperfect competition, this study’s 
hypothesis is price dispersion will increase as level of competition increases.  
 The responses of single and multi-source branded and generic drugs were 
compared separately to test this hypothesis.  The single source drug sample was 
comprised of 96% branded drugs and 4% single source generics.  The multi-source drug 
sample was comprised of 95% multi-source generics and 5% branded with generic 
available.  The single source drug sample was hypothesized to be less competitive due to 
additional regulatory protections associated with branded drugs.  
There were fewer discounts for branded than generic drugs. The single source 
drugs had smaller discounts (14.7%) of transaction prices to AWP than multi-source 
drugs (60%). This is a manifestation of less competition. In addition, single source drugs 
had less price diffusion than multi-source drugs with an average coefficient of variation 
of 5.6% compared to 43% for multi-source drugs.  This demonstrates greater price 
diffusion and confirms the study’s primary hypothesis.  However, the absolute level of 
price disparity was greater for single source drugs. Because they were much more 
expensive with a mean transaction price of $3929 compared $115, for multi-source the 
absolute level of price disparity was greater for single source than multi-source drugs 
($220 vs. $49).  
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Results suggest health plan type is associated with only small variation in the level of 
discount with high-deductible health plans having the smallest discounts.  Surprisingly, 
health plan size was negatively associated with the magnitude of the discount - providing 
no evidence for Type 2 price discrimination. The role of PBMs in the process could 
distort the relationship between plan size and the magnitude of the discounts. We do not 
know the level of discounts obtained by the PBMs. Small, but statistically significant, 
associations between patient characteristics, discounts and variation were observed.  A 
drug’s therapeutic benefit was not associated with price dispersion.  This study suggests 
the US cancer drug market exhibits significant price discrimination, with greater price 







 Price discrimination is the ability of a firm to charge different prices to different 
consumers for the same product.  In a truly competitive market, there is no price 
discrimination since there is only one clearing price for the market, occurring at the 
intersection of the aggregate market supply and demand curves.  However, in a market 
with imperfect competition, a firm may be able to price discriminate by charging 
different prices to different consumers, allowing the firm to capture a greater portion of 
consumer surplus and therefore transferring the consumer surplus from the patient to the 
producer in the form of higher profits for the firm.  For this to occur, three necessary 
conditions are required.159   
1. A firm must be able to act as a price setter, such that an individual firm’s demand 
curve is downward sloping akin to an aggregate market demand curve 
2. A firm must control the sale of its product 
3. A firm must be able to sort consumers by their demand (different demand 
elasticities for a drug) 
If these necessary conditions exist, then a firm may be able to price discriminate. 
There are three different types of price discrimination.  Type I price discrimination occurs 
when the firm can set the price for a product to every individual consumer’s maximum 
reserve price. It is often called perfect price discrimination since it transfers all consumer 
surplus to the drug company. This type of price discrimination is considered rare in the 
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real world.160  Type II price discrimination occurs when the firm prices a product based 
on the quantity consumed by that particular consumer. Type II price discrimination 
occurs when the price is based on the quantity purchased.  Type II price discrimination in 
pharmaceutical markets may exist in three levels.  First, drug distributors and wholesalers 
may be able to exact quantity discounts from the pharmaceutical company depending on 
quantity purchased.  Second, pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) can negotiate discounts 
directly from pharmaceutical companies based on quantities purchased or market size.161 
Third, health plans may be able to negotiate discounts based on the size of their plan. It is 
important to note that confidentiality agreements limit the observation of PBM and 
wholesaler discounts, and this will be a limitation discussed later in the paper. We will 
focus on the discounts obtained by the health plan. We believe this is the appropriate 
level of analysis since the person selects the health plan and not the PBM or the 
wholesaler.  
 Type III price discrimination occurs when the firm offers different prices for the 
same product to different groups of consumers. For cancer drugs within the commercially 
insured market, we are assuming that the actual consumer is the health plan and the 
demand of the health plan is hypothesized to be influenced by plan type and enrollee’s 
characteristics (See Chapter 2 for conceptual model). As noted in Chapter 2, the 
characteristics of the individual are less important because they do not make the actual 
formulary or pricing decisions. For Type III to occur, the drug company needs to be able 
to segment the market by the consumer’s demand elasticities.  One possible way drug 
companies could engage in Type III price discrimination is to negotiate prices based on a 
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health plans cost sharing and formulary structure.  Theoretically, the plan type (e.g. 
HMO), cost sharing, and formulary structure would affect a plan’s drug demand 
elasticities.  For example, the health insurer may have less price sensitivity (i.e. more 
inelastic price demand for drugs) if they can pass the cost onto the patient via high co-
pays or coinsurance amounts since their costs are partially transferred.  Alternatively, a 
plan with less affluent participants may be more price sensitive (more elastic price 
demand for drugs).  Lichtenberg (2010) suggested within US prices differentials were u-
shaped relative to income with poorer and richer people paying relatively less than the 
middle.162  This assumption has plausibility given that Medicaid programs have limited 
cost sharing. Another example is with health plans comprised of younger patients and 
therefore less likely to get cancer may be less sensitive to the price of cancer drugs and 
more willing to accept higher prices.  A further discussion of the three necessary 
conditions for price discrimination, different types of price discrimination, and 
associations behind Type III price discrimination is discussed in the context of the US 
cancer drug market in Chapter 2.   
Much of the existing literature on price discrimination and pharmaceuticals 
focuses on drug price dispersion geographically and patient out-of-pocket expenses, and 
drug price discrimination internationally.163 However, there are examples that suggest 
price discrimination within the US pharmaceutical market.  First, it’s been well 
documented that prices for drugs are much higher for the uninsured market compared to 
insured market in the range of 5-30%.164  Given that the drugs marketed to the uninsured 
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and insured are the same and there are negligible differences exists between the 
production or transportation of drugs to either market, a conclusion is that the price 
difference is primarily the result of drug companies setting higher prices for the 
uninsured (substantially higher than marginal cost), in effect, price discriminating.   
A source of evidence is found within the US Senate Finance Committee report 
“The Price of Sovaldi and Its Impact on the U.S. Health Care System”.165  Senate staff 
examined company documents from Gilead Sciences (maker of Sovaldi), and 
documented internal discussion of pricing strategy.  The pricing strategies clearly 
depicted Gilead as a price setter and discussing price levels for different payers to 
maximize profits. While the Senate report did not specifically mention price 
discrimination; the setting of different prices for the same drug implies price 
discrimination.  A third source of evidence of price discrimination is a 1996 lawsuit 
brought by retail pharmacies against pharmaceutical companies allege that discounts to 
HMOs, hospitals, PBMs, and other managed-care organizations were in violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act amendments of the Clayton Antitrust Act in part because of price 
discrimination.166  This case was eventually settled with no admissions of price 
discrimination; however, legal analysts suggested the existence of price discrimination 
was not questioned, rather, it was whether the price discrimination undermined the 
competitive process.167  Price discrimination is legal in the US except when it undermines 
the competitive process. 
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Price discrimination is not immediately observable since different prices may be 
the result of different cost functions or market dynamics; however, one framework to 
study for price discrimination is to examine levels of price dispersion and at different 
levels of market competition.  Since price discrimination is the ability to charge different 
prices for the same drug, researchers have used price dispersion as a proxy for a firm’s 
ability to price discriminate in markets suspected of price discrimination such as 
airlines.168  With this approach, empirical analysis of price discrimination often focused 
on the relationship of market power and competition on price dispersion-a proxy for a 
firm’s ability to price discriminate.  
3.2.1 Price Discrimination with Imperfect Competition 
Classical economic models present price discrimination only in markets with the 
supplier acting as a monopolist.169  However, several researchers have suggested price 
discrimination can exist in markets that are between true monopolies and perfect 
competition.  These markets are characterized with imperfect competition.  Economists 
consider markets to have imperfect competition if either the supplier (drug firm) or 
consumer (patient or health plan) has market power to set prices somewhere above the 
long-run competitive equilibrium.170  Monopolistic competition where the supplier 
produces a product that is differentiated from other products (e.g. branded) but at the 
same time has some substitutability is considered imperfect competition.  Same is true for 
oligopolistic competition where multiple suppliers produce nearly identical products but 
are differentiated enough and lack true substitutability, that their products are priced 
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above competitive equilibrium.  It is widely believed the US drug market has imperfect 
competition. 171   The US drug market is considered to have imperfect competition 
because of barriers to entry (expense to develop a new drug or regulatory hurdles), 
agency (physicians acting in both their own economic interest and the patient’s interest), 
and asymmetric information (patients have difficulty assessing the value of a drug).172 
In these markets with imperfect competition, several researchers have suggested 
in the presence of price discrimination, increased levels of competition leads to increase 
price dispersion.173    Initially, this hypothesis seems contrary to classical theory because 
traditional theory necessitates market power as a requirement for price discrimination and 
by extension increased market power (i.e. less competition) results in increased price 
discrimination.  However, economists have hypothesized that price discrimination in a 
market with imperfect competition is a unique and special case. It is considered to be on 
the continuum of perfect competition to monopoly. 
In a market with imperfect competition, the slope is based on two parts: the 
consumers’ price elasticity of demand and the consumers’ cross-price elasticity of 
substitutes.  For example, Trexall® (methrotrexate sodium) is a branded cancer drug used 
to treat a variety of cancers by inhibiting cell growth.174  The demand for Trexall® will 
depend on the own-price elasticity for Trexall®.  However, Trexall® also has a generic 
available under the molecular name “methrotrexate sodium.”  The generic drug is 
manufactured by several different manufacturers.  Because of generic availability, 
demand for Trexall® will also depend on the cross-price elasticity of “methrotrexate 
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sodium.” The demand in the generic market could be further complicated because generic 
manufacturers often charge varying price for the same generic molecule.175  This price 
variation can exist because of the imperfect competition in the US drug market due to 
barriers to entry, asymmetrical information, and problems of agency.  Health plans are 
incentivized to get patients access to low cost generics.  One approach for the health plan 
is to reduce copays for the use of contracted mail-order pharmacies to access lower priced 
“methrotrexate sodium.”  This is in contrast to markets with monopolistic competition 
where the slope of the demand curve is based solely on the consumer’s price elasticity of 
demand since there are no other substitutes.   
The ability of the health plan to steer patients to lower-priced drugs whether by 
steering them to use generic over brand or steering them to pharmacies with lower-priced 
generic manufacturer, is intuitively why price discrimination can exist in the generic 
market.  This line of reasoning seems appropriate for the US cancer drug market, because 
these drugs are not absolute monopolies as defined in economics since patients have 
alternatives.  Alternatives might include other cancer drugs that are more expensive, less 
effective, or have worse side effects. There are also non-drug substitutes such as using 
radiation or hospice care.  
On the spectrum of competitiveness, branded cancer drugs should be closer to the 
monopolistic-end compared to multi-source cancer drugs that should be closer to the free 
competition-end. This assumption will be tested.  The reason being is that multi-source 
cancer drugs have multiple manufacturers for the same drug since the formulation is no 
longer protected either by patent or market exclusivity.  Whereas branded drugs will only 
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have competition from therapeutic substitutes but the degree of substitutability varies by 
drug at the therapeutic class.  Some researchers have suggested the cancer drug class has 
few true therapeutic substitutes, rather many drugs act as complements to each other and 
used in combination or when other drugs do not work.176 
For markets with imperfect competition, both Borenstein177 and Holmes178 
independently developed theoretical models showing that increased competition is 
associated with more price dispersion. Borenstein used a spatial model of monopolistic 
competition and showed that competition is not a barrier to price discrimination as long 
as “gaps” in the market are driven by consumer brand preferences.  In the drug market, 
gaps can be driven by lack of perfect substitutes in the single source market, or driven by 
a health plans ability to steer patients to low cost pharmacies.  Holmes179 used 
mathematical proofs to show price discrimination could exist in situations with few 
suppliers.  He sets up his proofs starting with a market dominated by two firms producing 
similar products, yet some consumers have preference over one or the other.  He suggests 
the price differentials associated with price discrimination is in-line with a profit-
maximizing firm and can be explained by the ratio between the difference of two firm’s 
own price elasticities of demand and the cross price elasticity of demand.  In the drug 
markets, Holmes work is more applicable to multi-source drugs where few suppliers may 
exist.  However, both theories are similar in the sense that they both suggest price 
discrimination in imperfect markets and is due in part to market power (products 
differentiable) and cross-price elasticities.  
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Both models have been applied to markets with imperfect competition outside of 
the health care industry and empirically analyzed.180 In some cases, the model was 
confirmed, while in others it was not.181  One empirical example was an examination of 
price discrimination in the U.S. airline industry using price dispersion of airline tickets.182 
They argue that different ticket prices for the same trip cannot be explained by different 
cost functions. They found that dispersion increases on competitive routes. These two 
observations taken together suggest evidence of price discrimination and higher price 
discrimination in more competitive but not freely competitive markets.  This project will 
test the hypothesis that single source cancer drugs are in a less competitive environment 
and would show lower levels of price dispersion as compared to multi-source cancer 
drugs.  
The study will build upon previous theoretical work and empirically analyze 
evidence for price discrimination in the US cancer drug market proxied by price 
dispersion in commercial claims data.  But first, the premises of previous research must 
be discussed in the context of the US cancer drug market.  Dispersions in prices will be 
assessed using claims data. While there is no direct evidence, it is assumed the cost 
function for drugs is relatively uniform for the same drug for different patients in 
different health plans. Drugs are sold directly to wholesalers who distribute the drugs 
nationally to all purchasers. Drugs would have identical production costs and similar 
means of distribution, so we would expect similar costs.  Even if this assumption is 
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relaxed, production and distribution costs are small relative to prices paid for drugs183 so 
dispersion in these distribution costs should have minimal effect of prices.   
While it may be obvious that competition is greater in multi-source drugs and 
single source drugs, validating that the level of competition differs between multi-source 
and single source drugs is crucial for testing the primary hypothesis of this study.  The 
level of competition will be validated three ways.  First, a comparison of the discount 
(AWP minus transaction price) will be compared between single source and multi-source 
drugs.  Second, a comparison of the number of unique manufacturers will be done, and 
the hypothesis is that single source drugs have only one unique manufacturer while 
multisource drugs will have multiple.  Lastly, FDA approval dates will be examined to 
confirm that single source drugs are still under patent protection, where multisource 
drugs are not.  
The two drug groups being compared are single source and multi-source drugs.  
Single source drugs are patented. Brand name cancer drugs because of their patents are 
assumed to be in a low competitive environment.  Multi-source drugs are either generic 
drugs or brand drugs with generics available.  Multi-source drugs are assumed to be more 
competitive since generics can have multiple manufacturers for the same drug.  However, 
this does not mean that the generic market is perfectly competitive since there are 
regulatory barriers to enter the market, and due to these barriers, some generic drugs may 
have few or even one manufacturer. The aim is to compare the price dispersion for each 
molecule/biologic stratified by single source or multi-source.   
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Within each competitive environment (i.e. single source, multi-source), a relative 
level of competition will be explored by controlling the role of demand factors including 
health plans, patients, and drug characteristics on discounts and dispersion.  These 
demand factors should influence market power.  The relationship between demand 
factors and market power is discussed in Chapter 2 with an accompanying conceptual 
model.  We would expect the demand factors to have greater magnitude of impact in the 
single source environment.  
The main policy takeaway is a concern for access.  Price discrimination is 
indicative of an imperfect market with firms acting as price setters.184  We assume the 
firm sets the price to maximize profits, which can result in less output (less access to 
pharmaceuticals) compared to a truly competitive equilibrium.  Under profit maximizing 
price discrimination, drug companies will negotiate transaction prices to maximize profit 
within each market segment, with the transaction prices set equal to a health plan’s 
willingness to pay.  However, the AWP price is a national price that does not vary by 
market conditions. The drug has the same AWP price in all markets. It is the reason why 
we use AWP price as a measure of competition and a standard for measuring dispersion.  
Price discrimination raises concerns over access limitations for two reasons.  
First, a health plan’s willingness to pay is not necessarily a specific patient’s willingness 
to pay.  The health plan’s willingness to pay is assumed to be the average of all the 
enrollees in the health plans willingness to pay. However, not all enrollees will have 
identical willingness to pay for the same drug.  
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Second, many health plans in the commercially insured market are also for-profit 
and may restrict access especially if there is no “consumer surplus” left to share between 
the health plan and patient.  To illustrate this point, consider a drug’s reserve price for a 
health plan equal to the health plan’s value of that drug in a patient population.  The 
difference between the transaction price and reserve price represents the economic 
incentive for providing this drug to a patient population.  In a price discriminatory 
environment, the incentive is transferred to the drug company, which implies less 
incentive for a health plan to provide the drug resulting potentially in a more restrictive 
health plan. It is possible that the PBM shares some of the profits with the drug company 
or the health plan. The data does not allow us to examine this possible behavior.  In 
addition to a concern for access, there is an ethical concern with price discrimination. 
Because price discrimination implies some pay more and others pay less, there are 
potential winners and losers, and this raises questions of inequity.  The U.S. population 
faces relatively high inequity in their access to health care,185 but addressing inequity in a 
specific area of health care may still be desirable for policy makers.  
 
3.2.2 US Cancer Drug Market 
The study examines the price discrimination in the cancer drug market.  The 
cancer drug market is of specific interest for the study for several reasons.  First, cancer 
drugs, also known as antineoplastic, cancer, or oncologic drugs, is a large market, with 
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2015 US cancer drugs sales at $49 billion and expected continued growth.186  These 
drugs are often high-cost with the average cost per month of branded cancer drugs 
estimated at $10,000.187  
Branded denotes a company’s drug is protected by a patent or market exclusivity 
granted by either the US Patent and Trademark Office or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) respectively.  These mechanisms prevent competitors from 
copying the drug and entering the market, thereby limiting the supply of a drug to just 
one firm-creating imperfect competition with the level of competitiveness dependent on 
similarities of substitutes.  In addition, the high-prices are also the result of the underlying 
pharmaceutical market188 that has been characterized as imperfect due to barriers to entry 
(expense to develop a new drug or regulatory hurdles), agency (physicians acting in both 
their own economic interest and the patient’s interest), and asymmetric information 
(patients have difficulty assessing the value of a drug).189 
The high cost of cancer drugs has become a major concern for policy makers, 
physicians, and patients.190  It has been reported that high costs for cancer drugs, even 
just the deductibles and co-pay paid by patients, is associated with lower adherence to 
medication191, and adherence is critical for proper cancer care.192  Not only does the high 
cost of cancer drugs act as a barrier to treatment, but it also may substantially impact a 
patient’s or his/her family’s life including exhaustion of savings and personal 
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bankruptcy.193  In the presence of price discrimination, drugs can be priced above the 
normal competitive equilibrium meaning higher cost-sharing which reduces adherence. 
 
3.3 Data 
The study assesses evidence of price discrimination in the cancer drug market by 
examining levels of price dispersion in different competitive environments.  The data 
used is the Truven Health MarketScan® Research Database (MarketScan®) from 2010 to 
2014, supplemented with Truven Health Red Book®, and published literature.  
MarketScan® contains insurance claims for nearly 66 million Americans who have 
employer-sponsored health insurance.  The key data files from the MarketScan® 
database were the drug outpatient file, the outpatient services file, and enrollee file.  The 
Red Book® file provided information on cancer drugs.  A description of the data files 
and variables used is in Supplementary Table 1 of the Appendix.  Published literature 
provided information on the clinical effectiveness of the drug sample and date of initial 
FDA approval.   
 Cancer drugs and their corresponding National Drug Codes (NDCs) were 
identified using the antineoplastic therapeutic class indicator within the Red Book® data 
set.  The NDCs were matched to the MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims, and drugs 
were excluded if they had less than 100 observations and less than $1 million in sales 
over the study time period.  The drugs were categorized as “single source” or “multi-
source” which includes both multi-source generics and single source brands with generics 
based on their generic indicator in Red Book®.  96% of the observations were either 
                                                          




single source or multi-source generic.  There were 62 unique products, and Table 3.1 and 
3.2 provides summary statistics. 
 The MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims provide detail for each prescription 
claim by enrollee.  The claim lists the national drug code (NDC), Average Wholesale 
Price (AWP), number of units dispensed, payment from the insurer, payment from the 
enrollee, and other variables.  To identify comparable drugs with same dosage and units 
dispensed, an AWP per unit variable was created-this serves as a reference unit.  Three 
payment-per-unit variables were created for analysis: transaction price, payment from 
insurer, and patient cost-share.  Both the transaction price and payment from insurer 
variables were derived from two variables in the MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims.  
The patient cost-share was calculated the difference between the transaction price and 
payment from insurer.  The AWP per unit and transaction price variables form the 
foundation of the two variables of interest: the price difference and price dispersion.  
Price difference was calculated as the difference between AWP per unit and transaction 
price for each drug claim defined in Equation 1.  The price difference represents the 
approximate discount level; however, rebates from drug manufacturers are not 
represented in the transaction price suggesting the discount level has downward bias.  A 
discussion on rebates is in the Limitations section.  Price dispersion was calculated as the 
coefficient of variation of transaction prices within the AWP per unit transactions defined 
in Equation 2. 










The variable in Equation 1 will be used as a validation variable for the assessment 
of the relative level of imperfect competition in single source versus multi source drug 
environments.  The variable in Equation 2 will be the key dependent variable that proxies 
for price dispersion and by extension price discrimination.  The coefficient of variation 
was chosen as the primary measure of price dispersion because it is commonly used as a 
measure of variation. We also measure the gap between the 90th and 10th percentile of 
price paid for the same drug.  
 Other variables of interest include different consumer and drug characteristics.  
The consumer in the US cancer drug market can be considered on two levels: one 
consumer is the health plan and the other consumer is the patient.  The health plan is 
considered the primary consumer since it is often the primary payer and leverages 
formulary and utilization controls to influence demand.  The patient is considered a 
secondary consumer since they can have financial responsibility in the form of cost 
sharing and are ultimately responsible for filling the prescription.  This analysis does not 
mention PBMs, as this study will assume PBMs are an extension of the health plans and 
their drug demand is aligned with the health plan.  However, in certain circumstance this 
may not hold. Defining the relevant consumer is important since price discrimination can 
only occur if the seller can differentiate the consumers in one health plan from the 
consumers in another health plan.   
Drug companies will set prices with each health plan or in most cases through a 
PBM, thereby segmenting the market by plan.  Drug companies cannot price discriminate 
by individual patients since they do not sell directly to individual patients. However, drug 
companies may be able to price discriminate based on the aggregate of the patients’ 
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characteristics within a health plan.  For example, the demand mix for drugs could be 
different for a health plan enrolling employees in a male-dominated construction 
company versus a balanced male-female mix white collar company.  While others have 
found income to be associated with US price dispersion,194 this assertion will be 
controlled for in the analytic models.    
The MarketScan® data categorizes health plans into seven different health plan 
types based on health plan structure (e.g. health maintenance organization (HMO) or 
high-deductible health plan (HDHP)).  While the data does not provide formulary details, 
there are general attributes for each plan type that could influence demand for a drug.  
For example, HMOs and PPOs with capitation are assumed to be more price sensitive 
since they are incentivized to keep spending low, alternatively HDHP’s or CDHP’s could 
be better able to pass costs onto the patient via cost-sharing structures195 and therefore be 
less price sensitive.   
The dataset also provides a plan key for approximately 15% of the observations 
that links plans across data sets including enrollee data.  The plan key is a 6-digit code 
identifying a specific health plan, and not just health plan type.  The relative size of 
health plans measured by the relative number of enrollees is a surrogate for market share 
of health plan-a variable of interest for testing type II price discrimination.  Due to the 
fact that only 15% of the sample have the 6 digit code, only models with a plan key were 
tested specifically for type II price discrimination; other models included the full set of 
observations.  
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 Besides plan types, it is important to control for patient characteristics because of 
the indirect demand for cancer drugs via health plan demographic make-up.  The patient 
is identified by an enrollee variable and from this patient characteristics can be 
ascertained.  These include age, sex, cancer diagnosis, patient’s cost sharing in the form 
of copay and coinsurance, employee classification (e.g. hourly, union, etc.), and 
employee state.  The cancer diagnosis was determined by linking the MarketScan® 
Outpatient Drug claims to MarketScan® Outpatient Services claims which lists 
outpatient services including the primary and secondary diagnoses in the form of ICD-9 
variables.  These ICD-9 diagnoses were matched to types of cancer based on ICD-9 
cancer classifications.196   
Since patients could have multiple diagnoses and multiple visits, a proportion 
system was implemented to identify the primary cancer diagnosis. The cancer diagnosis 
with the highest proportion of diagnoses is ascribed to the enrollee within a given year.  
Drug characteristics considered include year of FDA approval, relative therapeutic 
benefits defined as increases overall survival in published trial data, and number of 
unique manufacturers.  The status of market protections, defined as either exclusivity or 
patented, were ascertained based on whether the drug was single source branded, in 
which case it was protected, or was either branded with generic options or generic.  For 
the number of unique manufacturers, data cleaning was done to ensure name variation 
(e.g. “Pfizer” vs “Pfizer, Inc.”) did not inflate the number of unique manufacturer.  
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 The relative therapeutic benefit was ascertained from published literature notably 
recent work by Howard et al.197 and Salas-Vega et al..198  The comparator for the 
therapeutic benefit was predominately standard of care.  The competitive environment 
was compared in the single versus multi-source environment; however, the number of 
competitors per drug was not directly controlled.  The main reason was the uncertainty in 
identifying true competitors since cancer drugs are often approved for multiple tumor 
sites and are used in combination or when others fail.  Regarding the latter, consider 
imatinib in which one could be tempted to label dasatinib a competitor since both are 
approved for chronic myeloid leukemia; however, imatinib will be often administered 
first and dasatinib will be used primarily in a subset of imatinib cases.199  In other words, 
within the single source brand, these drugs did not have true substitutes.  For multi-source 
drugs (same molecule, different manufacturer), there are direct competitors in terms of 
different companies making the same generic product; however, the competition is far 
from perfect.  
There are two important considerations when using cancer drug claims data.  
First, as with any pharmaceutical product, there’s concern about rebates and chargebacks 
and whether the data set allows us to observe actual prices paid.  Qualitative analysis 
does suggest that rebates are not prevalent or significant in the branded cancer market. A 
VP of a specialty pharmacy, Dr. Atheer Kaddis200 was quoted as “I typically don’t see 
rebates in the oncologics, even in classes where there is competition, such as renal 
carcinoma, where there are seven or eight drugs. That therapy is highly individualized 
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and the drugs tend not to be substitutable. There’s not a lot of opportunity for market 
share movement among the oncologics.”  Another drug pricing expert, Dr. Patricia 
Danzon, drew similar conclusions on rebates in cancer drugs noting the limited 
substitutability of many cancer drugs.201  Both expert opinions are backed by economic 
theory.202   
Ellison and Snyder’s research supports the hypothesis that supplier competition is 
a prerequisite for countervailing power, in other words, rebates (a form of countervailing 
power) would not be in drug markets with limited supplier competition.  The research 
suggests that the cancer drug market indeed has limited supplier competition.203 
Second, outliers exist. Outliers can be the result of data entry mistakes or unique 
situations.  It is important to minimize the impact of outliers that were due to data entry 
mistakes.  It is also important to ensure the outliers due to unique situations do not 
mislead the analysis or generalizability. For example, prescription payments could be 
denied by insurer resulting in zero or negative payments that inflate the price dispersion.  
Outliers were identified as observations with negative payment values, and payments per 
unit that were magnitudes larger than expected (e.g. 300 units filled at a price normally fit 
for 30 units).  These were identified through exploratory data analysis of the extreme 
percentiles and were excluded from final analysis.  The algorithm for outliers is in the 
Appendix.   
3.4 Methods 
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 The study quantifies price discounts and dispersion in two competitive cancer 
drug environments.  It is hypothesized that price dispersion differences would exist 
between the two environments if price discrimination exists and dispersion would be 
greater in the multi-source environment.  The study began with preparation and cleaning. 
This included identifying cancer drugs in the Red Book® data set and linking these to 
MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims, classification of enrollee cancer diagnoses, 
creation of payment variables, and exclusion of outliers.  Standard summary statistics are 
presented in Table 3.2 for the cancer drugs.  Univariate analysis was conducted to 
examine the level of price difference and price dispersion categorized by the level of 
market protection of a drug (single source versus multi-source generic).  These results 
were stratified across consumer characteristics of interest including cancer diagnoses and 
health plan type.  Results of the univariate analysis are in Table 3.3. 
 Multivariate analysis was conducted using two similar regression approaches, one 
for single source branded drugs and the other for multi-source drugs.  The specific 
regression model is a mixed method linear model to account for random effects for each 
drug. Equations 3 and 4 are the full multivariate models used in the analysis.  The use of 
drug-level random effects provides the model flexibility for potentially unobserved 
characteristics for each drug that could influence the pricing or price dispersion of the 
drug.   
EQ 3  𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽1[𝐷𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖 + 𝛽2[𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3[𝑃𝐿𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
EQ 4  𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1[𝐷𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖 + 𝛽2[𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3[𝑃𝐿𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
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DCHAR: drug characteristics including overall survival, no. 
manufacturers, years since approval 
PCHAR: patient characteristics including age, sex, employee classification 
PLCHAR: plan characteristics including plan type and plan market share 
 
Two dependent variables were regressed: price difference and price dispersion for 
drug i and AWP-unit j.  Independent variables include a time variable to account for the 
longitudinal nature of data, variables representing health plan characteristics, variables 
for patient characteristics, and variables for drug characteristics.  The null hypothesis is 
that these characteristics are not associated with the level of price difference or price 
dispersion for either single source or multi-source drugs.   
Five different regression models analyzed for the single source and multi-source 
drugs separately.  Coefficients were compared across models.  For single source, the 
reduced model had 626,757 observations.  Since health plan market share was only 
available for approximately 15% of the observations, only two of the five regressions 
included the market share variable.  For these two regressions there were 64,849 
observations.  For model pairs that had the same number of observations, a log-likelihood 
ratio test was performed.  The null hypothesis of this test is that the simpler (fewer 
explanatory variables) was the true model.  Results of these models are in Table 3.4 
(dependent variable: discount) and Table 3.5 (dependent variable: coefficient of 
variation). Variables were deemed statistically significant at the p≤.05 level.   
 Evidence for price discrimination was assessed by examining levels of dispersion 
between the two competitive environments, and by comparing coefficients across model 
results for direction, magnitude, and significance.  Qualitatively, there’s reason to believe 
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the price discrimination exists since branded cancer drugs satisfied three prerequisites, 
but we need to reject the null hypothesis based on the empirical testing of the models.   
The key test for price discrimination is that the level of price dispersion is higher 
in multi-source drugs compared to single source drugs.  Within each competitive 
environment, another test for price discrimination is the examination of the coefficients 
for drug characteristics such as relative therapeutic benefit and number of manufacturers 
since these characteristics would have the most influence on a competitive environment.  
If health plans and indirectly patients negotiate with drug manufacturers when setting a 
price, then one would expect the drug characteristics especially relative therapeutic 
benefit to have significant magnitude and significance.  The reason being is that an 
individual drugs therapeutic benefit will be most likely related to market power and a 
manufacturer would not be able price discriminate if it did not have market power. 
Patients and health plans will be more sensitive to drugs that have greater therapeutic 
benefit.   
 
3.5 Results 
 A total of 62 distinct cancer drugs, entailing 304 NDCs and 4.7 million 
prescription fills for 602 thousand patients from the years 2010-2014 were analyzed.  Of 
62 drugs, 46 were single source brand drugs and 19 were multi source, with 3 
overlapping due to expiration of exclusivity.  
 The average difference between AWP and total payment for single source brand 
drugs is 14%, and 60% for multi-source drugs.  In drug pricing, and AWP is the 
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benchmark price and manufacturers make the greatest profit when the price gets close to 
the AWP; in a noncompetitive environment you would expect the manufacturer to set 
prices close to the AWP.  In a more competitive environment, the gap between AWP and 
transaction price should be significantly larger.  
 The coefficient of dispersion for single source brand drugs across plans is 5.6%, 
and 43% for multi-source drugs. The higher variation suggests rejection of the null 
hypothesis that price discrimination does not exist and level of dispersion is the same 
across competitive environments.   
It is important to look at both the relative differences in dispersion and the dollar 
amount of the dispersion. While 43% is higher than the 5.6%, multi-source drugs which 
has a mean reimbursement of $115 and so the 43% indicates standard deviation of $49. 
However because the mean reimbursement for single source oncologic drugs is $3929, 
the dollar value for the dispersion is actually greater ($220).  In other words, while the 
relative level of dispersion is higher in multi-source, the dollar amount of dispersion is 
lower than single source.  For policy makers, the dollar amount of dispersion may be 
more important than the relative distribution. For single source drug, the average gap 
between prices paid at 10th percentile drug reimbursement 90th percentile is $257. For 
some drugs, gap is larger, i.e. the gap for imatinib is $530. The absolute difference may 
be more important to policy makers. 
 Univariate analysis was conducted for plan, patient, and drug characteristics.  
Refer to Table 3.3 for results.  The differences are relatively small across the health plans 
especially for single source branded drugs. The most common health plan type in the 
sample was a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO).  For single source drugs, 
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Comprehensive Health Plans had the largest discount to AWP for single source branded 
at 15.3%, while High Deductible Health Plans had the smallest discount at 13.4%.  For 
multi-source drugs, Point of Service plans with capitation (POS) had the smallest 
discount to AWP for multi-source drugs at 50.9% while Point-of-Service plans without 
capitation had the largest discount at 61.1%.   
Market share was related to price dispersion in a very small amount.  We 
compared the difference in price discounts for plans with more and less than 5% market 
share. In the univariate analysis, plans with 1-5% market share had the smallest discount 
to AWP for single source branded, while plans with greater than 5% market share had the 
smallest discount to AWP for multi-source drugs.  This is counter intuitive especially in 
light of an hypothesis or 2nd degree price discrimination, which suggests larger plans 
would have access to lower prices. However, it may be the case that the larger plans have 
more restrictive formularies and drug companies counter the restriction with higher 
prices.  Alternatively, PBMs may negotiate prices for several plans and the market size 
indicator is flawed. However, the analysis does not show the health plans with the larger 
market share consistently getting the highest discounts.  
 We examined the differences by type of cancer and demographic characteristics. 
Breast cancer was the most common cancer diagnoses. Other common types include non-
melanoma skin cancer and bone cancer.  Few patterns were noticed in the price 
difference and dispersion across cancer types, although breast cancer had larger discounts 
than most cancers. For patient characteristics, no noticeable differences in discounts or 
dispersion were observed for employment type, and for sex, males had a slightly larger 
discount.  Interestingly, the middle age group (26-45 year olds) had the smallest discount 
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for single source branded drugs, and the youngest group (<26 year olds) had the smallest 
discount for multi-source drugs.  These results suggest within a competitive environment 
either single or multi-source, the age of patients within each drug may be correlated with 
cancer types. This is hypothesized to effect demand and this affects a drug’s competitive 
leverage.  
For drug characteristics, no difference was observed for relative therapeutic 
benefit for branded drugs.  This is surprising because it would be assumed that patient’s 
would be responsive to the level of therapeutic benefit. One interpretation of this 
surprising result is that prices of branded drugs are set using existing drug prices plus 
additional margin,204205 and not on a drug’s relative effectiveness. In order to compare the 
effect of competition, a binary variable indicating 7 or fewer manufacturers vs. 8 or more 
was created. Drugs with fewer distinct manufacturers (less competition) had smaller 
discounts and less price dispersion compared to drugs with more distinct manufacturers. 
 While the univariate results provide an overall landscape of price dispersion in the 
US cancer market, the multivariate regression results take into consideration the 
competing factors of demand and price dispersion.  Two multilevel linear regression 
models were performed across five subsets of data with random effects at the drug 
product level.  Results from models using the pay difference dependent variable are 
reported in Table 3.4, and results from models using the pay dispersion dependent 
variable are reported in Table 3.5.  For interpretation sake, the negative sign for pay 
difference was flipped i.e. -10% becomes 10%.  Since market share was only ascertained 
for a subgroup of health plans, model testing was conducted between models with market 
                                                          
204 Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). 
205 Salas-Vega S., Iliopoulos, O., & Mossialos, E. (2016). 
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share and between models without market share.  The log likelihood ratio test suggest 
models with the full complement of independent variables provided better explanatory 
power as compared to simpler models with fewer variables.     
 Across models that were not restricted to observations with market share (Models 
1-3), statistical significance was observed for many variables.  This is not surprising 
given the large sample sizes.  There are a few general trends to note.  The positive sign 
and significance of the year variable suggests an increasing trend of greater discounts and 
price dispersion across all models for both single and multi-source drugs.  The 
coefficients for many health plan types were statistically significant.  In the single source 
drugs, POS plans pays slightly higher than other health plans; however, the magnitude of 
difference between plan types is generally minimal (1.6 percentage point difference 
between highest and lost paid plan type in the single source drugs).  In multi-source 
drugs, HDHP plans pay the least.  POS plans are also associated with greater price 
dispersion for multi-source drugs, perhaps suggesting a wider range of benefits across 
plans categorized as POS.   
In the presence of 3rd degree price discrimination in which drug companies price 
discriminate across plan types, one would expect differences in the level of discounts, 
which is confirmed albeit small.  Additionally, the level of discounts for plan types 
should vary more in the competitive multi-source environment compared to the single 
source environment, again confirmed as seen in Table 3.3.  
 Interestingly, the log of market share for single source drugs is a negative 
statistically significant coefficient, which is interpreted as for every 1% increase in 
market share, plans pay on average .2% higher relative to other plans.  This is 
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counterintuitive and this will be discussed later in this chapter.   Age, measured in years, 
has a statistically significant impact, but it is practically minimal.  Females are associated 
with slightly lower discounts, again with minimal impact.  Being an hourly employee is 
associated with an incrementally larger discount.  Perhaps one of the most interesting 
findings is a drug’s relative therapeutic benefit is not associated with the size of a 
discount for single source drugs.    
 
3.6 Discussion 
The US cancer drug market is a significant market with nearly $49 billion in sales 
in 2015206 and generally dominated by single source branded drugs.  Given the market 
power of these drugs, limited ability to arbitrage by wholesalers and intermediaries, and 
the general fragmentation of the US health care market, one would expect some level of 
price dispersion.  The study shows that price dispersion exists both for single source or 
multi-source drugs with the magnitude of dispersion greater for multi-source drugs but 
the dollar amount greater for the single source.  This confirms the hypothesis that in 
imperfect markets, in the presence of price discrimination, dispersion would be greater as 
the competitive environment increases. 
 One of the principal aims of this study was to assess evidence for price 
discrimination.  Circumstantial evidence suggests price discrimination should exist for 
the single source brand market since the single source branded drugs satisfy the 
prerequisites of price discrimination.  These branded drug companies are price setters; 
                                                          
206 http://www.imshealth.com/en/about-us/news/ims-health-study-global-market-for-cancer-treatments-
grows-to-107-billion-in-2015-fueled-by-record-level-of-innovation [ACCESSED: Jan 18 2017] 
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there is limited arbitrage in the market due to regulations; and companies can 
differentiate consumers who have different utilities.  The study established that dispersion 
exists and the level of price dispersion is greater in the more competitive environment - 
suggesting price discrimination.207 208   
While this study was unable to fully extricate the role of bargaining and PBMs 
versus price discrimination in dispersion of prices, there are two potential findings that 
could support price discrimination in the US cancer market.  First, the dispersion in prices 
for single source branded drugs should be lower than the dispersion in prices for multi-
source drugs if the health plans key bargaining leverage is multiple competing drugs and 
cross-price elasticity to competitors.  For the most part, single source branded drugs 
would compete with other drugs within their targeted therapeutic area.  Therefore, a 
health plan’s ability to bargain is limited to essentially the placement of the single source 
branded drug on a specific tier or the use of utilization controls and therapeutic 
equivalents including non-drug treatments such as radiation chemotherapy.  However, the 
countervailing power to bargain for lower prices is limited by lack of supply competition 
in single source branded drugs.  More practically, for the drug company, placement on a 
formulary tier is important as it determines a patient’s co-pay and coinsurance, but the 
impact could be mitigated with the use of coupons and patient assistance programs.  
Specifically, coupons and patient assistance programs would offset a patient’s co-pay 
only for branded drugs; these mechanisms give branded drugs even greater market 
power. 
                                                          
207 Borenstein, S. (1985).  
208 Holmes, T.J. (1989). 
84 
 
 Secondary analysis of the study showed that patients’ co-pays and coinsurance 
for branded drugs were relatively low representing just 3% of total payment for each 
drug, possibly due to the impact of coupons or out-of-pocket maximums being reached.  
In essence, there is little reason for a single source branded drug to accept lower 
negotiated prices from a payer unless there are therapeutic equivalents.  If there is little 
reason to accept lower prices, then the dispersion observed could be due to price 
discrimination by the drug company.  Price discrimination may enable drug companies to 
be placed more favorably across formularies thereby generating higher utilization and 
profits, then a uniform pricing environment. 
The second possible evidence suggestive of price discrimination is the lack of 
magnitude and significance of the coefficient for the relative therapeutic benefit for single 
source branded drugs.  Under the hypothesis that the health plan negotiates with drug 
companies as equals, one would expect the health plan to negotiate bigger discounts for 
drugs with less therapeutic benefit relative to drugs with more therapeutic benefit.  
However, this was not observed, and reinforces previous literature that suggests pricing 
and effectiveness of the drug are not linked.209   
3.7 Limitations 
 The study has several limitations. First, as discussed in the data section, there are 
two important considerations when using cancer drug claims data: 
rebates/coupons/chargebacks, and outliers.  One of the motivations for examining cancer 
drugs is the general consensus from experts that rebates/coupons/chargebacks are not 
widely prevalent in this therapeutic class.  For outliers, the database required significant 
                                                          
209 Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). 
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data cleaning, and summary statistics and histograms were widely used throughout the 
process to identify areas of concern.  The data cleaning was spent to reduce for outliers 
due to inaccuracies of the data set, but a limitation is that the data cleaning may have 
eliminated some for naturally occurring outliers that are important for policymakers to 
consider given the skewness of healthcare spending. 
 The last notable limitation is the limited generalizability of the US cancer drug 
market to other markets such as other therapeutic classes or even other countries. Other 
entities, notably the National Institute of Clinical Excellence in England has recognized 
the uniqueness of the cancer drug market and proscribes cancer drug specific regulations.   
 
3.8 Policy Takeaways 
In a truly competitive efficient market, price dispersion does not exist since any 
deviance of prices would entice new competitors and arbitrage.  Price dispersion does 
exist in both the single and multi-source cancer drug market, reinforcing the notion that 
the market is imperfect and price discrimination exists. Researchers have suggested price 
discrimination in pharmaceuticals improves societal welfare by facilitating 
pharmaceuticals to be priced at levels to access markets that would otherwise not be 
served under a uniform price system.210  However, for policy makers a driving concern is 
patient access.  This study has shown lower discounts, higher prices, and less price 
dispersion in the US single source cancer drug market relative to multi-source drugs.  All 
three attributes will limit access to these drugs by limiting affordability.  While price 
                                                          
210 Danzon, P. (1997). 
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discrimination enables companies to access different market segments (i.e. health plan), 
within each market segment prices could be set high thereby limiting access through 
affordability or formulary controls. 
   Policy makers can address the imperfect aspects of the US pharmaceutical 
market using a variety of policy levers.  However, policymakers must recognize that the 
market is imperfect and accept that imperfect markets have consequences.  
 First, economic theory suggests monopolist and oligopolists will rationally price 
higher than a competitive equilibrium resulting in less quantity supplied; one might 
consider the high price and limited uptake of the novel hepatitis C drugs as an example. 
Because of high prices, less than 15% of people with hepatitis C are actually receiving 
the drug. Second, price dispersion ultimately means some patients either through 
premiums or co-pays will pay more than other patients.  This should be a significant 
concern for policymakers especially within the US where significant inequities exist.211  
The difference between the 10th and 90th price paid in single source drugs is $300, but for 
some high priced drugs that gap increases to above $500.  If the patient is paying a 
significant percentage of the cost of the drug then price discrimination can have a large 
impact on the out-of-pocket spending.  Lastly, for policymakers price discrimination 
represents a transfer of consumer surplus to pharmaceutical companies in terms of higher 
profits.    
 
 
                                                          
211 Davis, K., & Ballreich, J. (2014). 
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 3.9 Conclusion 
 The US cancer drug market satisfies all three necessary conditions for price 
discrimination. This study suggests price discrimination does exist based on the existence 
of less price dispersion for single source drugs and increased price dispersion for multi-
source drugs.  For single source drugs, the gap between the 10th and 90th price paid may 
be small relative to total prices, but still significant in the absolute.  Some hypothesized 
demand factors were associated with relative levels of dispersion as suggested in Chapter 




3.10 APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.1: Summary of Cancer Drugs in the US Market 2010-2014 




AFINITOR Everolimus  $11,214   $9,585  17,874 
ANASTROZOLE Anastrozole  $544   $184  158,997 
ARIMIDEX Anastrozole  $638   $436  90,908 
AROMASIN Exemestane  $639   $519  46,969 
AVASTIN Bevacizumab  $6,530   $5,522  534 
BICALUTAMIDE Bicalutamide  $717   $178  18,204 
BOSULIF Bosutinib  $10,015   $8,347  479 
CAPECITABINE Capecitabine  $2,382   $1,900  13,309 
CAPRELSA Vandetanib  $11,951   $10,241  453 
COMETRIQ Cabozantinib Malate  $12,806   $10,981  188 
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE Cyclophosphamide  $468   $338  20,291 
ERIVEDGE Vismodegib  $10,204   $8,713  807 
ETOPOSIDE Etoposide  $1,390   $1,071  2,317 
EXEMESTANE Exemestane  $673   $429  112,980 
FARESTON Toremifene Citrate  $1,227   $1,047  4,618 
FASLODEX Fulvestrant  $675   $524  240 
FEMARA Letrozole  $7,072   $6,133  166,049 
GILOTRIF Afatinib Dimaleate  $8,453   $7,223  640 
GLEEVEC Imatinib Mesylate  $6,584   $5,597  84,948 
HERCEPTIN Trastuzumab  $4,953   $4,246  676 
ICLUSIG Ponatinib Hydrochloride  $12,366   $10,583  440 
IMBRUVICA Ibrutinib  $10,729   $9,134  2,345 
INLYTA Axitinib  $10,512   $8,997  2,583 
LETROZOLE Letrozole  $654   $295  119,963 
LEUPROLIDE ACETATE Leuprolide Acetate  $407   $236  56,157 
LUPANETA PACK Leuprolide Acetate;Norethindrone Ace  $2,105   $1,779  791 
LUPRON DEPOT Leuprolide Acetate  $2,599   $2,148  65,014 
MEGACE ES Megestrol Acetate  $1,671   $1,405  9,353 
MEGESTROL ACETATE Megestrol Acetate  $749   $638  60,755 
MEKINIST Trametinib Dimethyl Sulfoxide  $80   $43  1,083 
MERCAPTOPURINE Mercaptopurine  $10,341   $8,741  313,733 
METHOTREXATE Methotrexate Sodium  $244   $105  581,342 
METHOTREXATE SODIUM Methotrexate Sodium  $100   $30  1,697,232 
NEXAVAR Sorafenib Tosylate  $74   $30  10,290 
NILANDRON Nilutamide  $8,781   $7,516  517 
POMALYST Pomalidomide  $12,566   $10,688  879 
RITUXAN Rituximab  $13,482   $11,468  1,913 
SPRYCEL Dasatinib  $9,478   $8,047  21,771 
STIVARGA Regorafenib  $11,786   $10,195  2,655 
SUTENT Sunitinib Malate  $8,841   $7,533  15,379 
TAFINLAR Dabrafenib Mesylate  $8,431   $7,170  1,175 
TAMOXIFEN CITRATE Tamoxifen Citrate  $122   $29  655,964 
TARCEVA Erlotinib Hydrochloride  $6,092   $5,206  27,836 
TARGRETIN Bexarotene  $8,808   $7,628  1,342 
TASIGNA Nilotinib Hydrochloride  $9,005   $7,688  14,502 
TEMODAR Temozolomide  $2,865   $2,444  49,043 
TEMOZOLOMIDE Temozolomide  $2,783   $2,123  15,066 
TREXALL Methotrexate Sodium  $174   $146  7,866 
TYKERB Lapatinib Ditosylate  $4,522   $3,864  12,764 
VALCHLOR Mechlorethamine Hydrochloride  $4,979   $4,434  226 
VELCADE Bortezomib  $6,433   $5,453  133 
VOTRIENT Pazopanib Hydrochloride  $7,199   $6,141  9,768 
XALKORI Crizotinib  $13,236   $11,387  2,880 
XELODA Capecitabine  $1,715   $1,465  95,444 
XTANDI Enzalutamide  $9,298   $7,904  2,601 
ZELBORAF Vemurafenib  $11,480   $9,980  2,908 
ZOLINZA Vorinostat  $9,196   $7,774  528 
ZYKADIA Ceritinib  $15,674   $13,625  141 
ZYTIGA Abiraterone Acetate  $7,295   $ 6,229  8,142 
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Table 3.2: Price Difference and Price Dispersion for Cancer drugs 

















AFINITOR 17,874 17,874 0 0 0 3 .038 -.144 
ANASTROZOLE 158,997 0 0 155,771 3,226 20 .641 -.706 
ARIMIDEX 90,908 73,539 17,369 0 0 1 .086 -.159 
AROMASIN 46,969 39,587 7,382 0 0 2 .324 -.162 
AVASTIN 534 534 0 0 0 1 .041 -.155 
BICALUTAMIDE 18,204 0 0 18,204 0 12 .574 -.747 
BOSULIF 479 479 0 0 0 1 .049 -.153 
CAPECITABINE 13,309 0 0 13,309 0 2 .147 -.213 
CAPRELSA 453 453 0 0 0 1 .019 -.139 
COMETRIQ 188 188 0 0 0 1 .026 -.143 
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE 20,291 0 0 19,819 472 2 .173 -.240 
ERIVEDGE 807 807 0 0 0 1 .023 -.147 
ETOPOSIDE 2,317 0 0 2,317 0 1 .130 -.218 
EXEMESTANE 112,980 0 0 112,980 0 3 .275 -.364 
FARESTON 4,618 4,618 0 0 0 2 .108 -.143 
FASLODEX 240 240 0 0 0 1 .023 -.145 
FEMARA 166,049 154,433 11,616 0 0 3 .069 -.153 
GILOTRIF 640 640 0 0 0 1 .058 -.135 
GLEEVEC 84,948 84,948 0 0 0 3 .055 -.146 
HERCEPTIN 676 676 0 0 0 1 .026 -.151 
ICLUSIG 440 440 0 0 0 1 .034 -.145 
IMBRUVICA 2,345 2,345 0 0 0 1 .051 -.149 
INLYTA 2,583 2,583 0 0 0 1 .087 -.142 
LETROZOLE 119,963 0 0 105,999 13,964 11 .606 -.551 
LEUPROLIDE ACE 56,157 0 0 51,756 4,401 4 .417 -.399 
LUPANETA PACK 791 791 0 0 0 1 .069 -.150 
LUPRON DEPOT 65,014 56,611 0 0 8,403 2 .058 -.149 
MEGACE ES 9,353 9,353 0 0 0 1 .051 -.147 
MEGESTROL ACE 60,755 0 0 60,755 0 4 .370 -.576 
MEKINIST 1,083 1,083 0 0 0 1 .034 -.155 
MERCAPTOPURINE 313,733 0 0 313,733 0 5 .426 -.567 
METHOTREXATE 581,342 0 0 581,342 0 8 .433 -.610 
METHOTREXATE NA 1,697,232 0  0 1,697,232 0 8 .422 -.619 
NEXAVAR 10,290 10,290 0 0 0 2 .049 -.143 
NILANDRON 517 517 0 0 0 1 .050 -.148 
POMALYST 879 879 0 0 0 1 .025 -.151 
RITUXAN 1,913 1,913 0 0 0 1 .039 -.149 
SPRYCEL 21,771 21,771 0 0 0 1 .056 -.151 
STIVARGA 2,655 2,655 0 0 0 2 .063 -.135 
SUTENT 15,379 8,080 0 0 7,299 2 .040 -.145 
TAFINLAR 1,175 1,175 0 0 0 1 .029 -.152 
TAMOXIFEN CITRATE 655,964 0 0 655,964 0 6 .498 -.712 
TARCEVA 27,836 27,836 0 0 0 1 .045 -.145 
TARGRETIN 1,342 1,342 0 0 0 2 .076 -.147 
TASIGNA 14,502 14,502 0 0 0 3 .041 -.147 
TEMODAR 49,043 48,910 133 0 0 2 .057 -.144 
TEMOZOLOMIDE 15,066 0 0 9,490 5,576 2 .171 -.240 
TREXALL 7,866 7,866 0 0 0 3 .071 -.150 
TYKERB 12,764 12,764 0 0 0 1 .045 -.144 
VALCHLOR 226 226 0 0 0 1 .061 -.111 
VELCADE 133 108 0 0 25 1 .022 -.159 
VOTRIENT 9,768 9,768 0 0 0 1 .040 -.147 
XALKORI 2,880 2,880 0 0 0 1 .035 -.143 
XELODA 95,444 90,884 2,051 0 2,509 2 .058 -.146 
XTANDI 2,601 2,601 0 0 0 1 .038 -.150 
ZELBORAF 2,908 2,908 0 0 0 1 .091 -.131 
ZOLINZA 528 528 0 0 0 1 .079 -.153 
ZYKADIA 141 141 0 0 0 1 .047 -.130 
ZYTIGA 8,142 8,142 0 0 0 1 .054 -.146 
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Table 3.3: Price Variation and Differences across Factors 
 
 
Health Plan Characteristics Multi Source Single Source Cancers Multi Source Single Source Employee Characteristics Multi Source Single Source 




.427 -.611 .056 -.156 BONE 
213,443 
66,092 
.424 -.583 .055 -.147 Salary  
736,679 
115,815 




.425 -.594 .056 -.144 BRAIN 
23,594 
69,024 
.270 -.372 .056 -.148 Hourly  
690,500 
106,012 




.429 -.608 .056 -.141 BREAST 
1,026,194 
185,286 
.440 -.581 .060 -.152 Other 1,427,179 
221,827 




.435 -.611 .056 -.153 COLON 
23,892 
51,651 
.288 -.417 .055 -.144 Male  
951,786 
205,895 




.430 -.595 .055 -.146 HEAD 
24,193 
53,273 
.376 -.527 .048 -.145 Female 3,034,750 
422,085 




.423 -.509 .057 -.149 LEUKEMIA 
32,427 
99,942 




.432 -.579 .057 -.158 LUNG 
19,693 
49,999 
.371 -.521 .047 -.145 <25  
260,453 
26,615 




.433 -.568 .056 -.145 LYMPHOMA 
73,116 
55,626 
.404 -.535 .053 -.145 26-45  
909,692 
145,933 
.437 -.605 .056 -.143 
Marketshare     NONCOLON 
48,551 
104,350 
.327 -.464 .053 -.145 46-65 2,817,160 
455,551 




.435 -.634 .054 -.146 NONSPEC 
48,698 
65,176 




.427 -.652 .055 -.146 PROSTATE 
34,942 
18,064 
.492 -.674 .058 -.148 OS≤3  
456,928 
288,919 




.424 -.603 .055 -.144 SECOND 
113,446 
140,801 
.378 -.523 .052 -.145 OS>3 3,530,377 
344,776 
.431 -.616 .052 -.148 
     SKIN 
205,588 
40,031 
.427 -.587 .057 -.147 Distinct Cos. 
<8 companies 
.395 -.550   
     TESTES 
1,509 
954 
.414 -.598 .049 -.148 Distinct Cos. 
≥8 companies 
.449 -.620   
     URIN 
18,125 
35,923 
.414 -.582 .047 -.145      
     UTERINE 
58,865 
20,309 
.398 -.565 .052 -.148      
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Table 3.4: Regression Results Pay Differences 





















N 626,757 4,025,593 638,696 4,025,674 626,757 4,025,593 66,034 384,061 64,849 384,061 
           
Year 0.0040*** -0.1050*** 0.0031*** -0.0677*** 0.0040*** -0.1050*** 0.0048*** -0.0560*** 0.0054*** -0.1008*** 
Comp -0.0108*** -0.0094*** -0.0097*** -0.0032*** -0.0108*** -0.0094*** 0.0057 0.0438** 0.0044 0.0358** 
EPO -0.0172*** -0.0220*** -0.0172*** -0.0257*** -0.0172*** -0.0220*** 0.0191** 0.0895*** 0.0208** 0.1039*** 
HMO -0.0211*** -0.0046*** -0.0208*** -0.0054*** -0.0211*** -0.0046*** -0.0037 0.0409** -0.0027 0.0469*** 
POS -0.0105*** 0.0006 -0.0102*** 0.0001 -0.0105*** 0.0006 -0.0084 0.0683*** -0.0081 0.0690*** 
PPO -0.0169*** -0.0069*** -0.0166*** -0.0066*** -0.0169*** -0.0069*** 0.0019 0.0236 0.0026 0.0273* 
PPOCAP -0.0137*** -0.0682*** -0.0135*** -0.0684*** -0.0137*** -0.0682*** 0.0001 -0.0769*** 0.0015 -0.0682*** 
CDHP -0.0051*** -0.0001 -0.0048*** -0.0010 -0.0051*** -0.0001 0.0032 0.0171 0.0041 0.0251 
HDHP -0.0178*** -0.0065*** -0.0177*** -0.0093*** -0.0178*** -0.0065*** 0.0025 -0.0028 0.0042 0.0075 
Marketshare 
(log) 
      -0.0021*** 0.0094*** -0.0019*** 0.0093*** 
Hourly 
Employee 
0.0059*** 0.0132*** 0.0059*** 0.0135*** 0.0059*** 0.0132***   0.0034*** 0.0110*** 
Age (log) 0.0085*** 0.0460***   0.0085*** 0.0460***   0.0062*** 0.0563*** 















     0.0083 
 
   0.0061 
Cons 0.1398*** -2.4692*** 0.1536*** 0.5525*** 0.0996*** -2.6439*** 0.1595*** 0.3957*** 0.1598*** -3.1002*** 





Table 3.5: Regression Results Pay Dispersion 





















N 626,757 4,025,593 638,696 4,025,674 626,757 4,025,593 66,034 384,061 64,849 384,061 
           
Year 0.0223*** -0.0765*** 0.0724*** -0.0035*** 0.0223*** -0.0765*** 0.0589*** 0.0111*** 0.0223*** -0.0562*** 
Comp 0.0101*** 0.0270*** 0.0094** 0.0336*** 0.0101*** 0.0270*** 0.1039* 0.0627*** 0.1077* 0.0554*** 
EPO -0.0010 0.0270*** -0.0044 0.0226*** -0.0010 0.0270*** 0.0788 0.0239 0.0844 0.0313 
HMO -0.0128*** 0.0298*** -0.0157*** 0.0295*** -0.0128*** 0.0298*** 0.0901 0.0518** 0.1006* 0.0512** 
POS -0.0095*** 0.0304*** -0.0115*** 0.0299*** -0.0095*** 0.0304*** 0.0683 0.0804*** 0.0757 0.0821*** 
PPO -0.0123*** 0.0254*** -0.0152*** 0.0268*** -0.0123*** 0.0254*** 0.0920* 0.0635*** 0.0998* 0.0630*** 
PPOCAP -0.0177** 0.0263*** -0.0226*** 0.0248*** -0.0177** 0.0263*** 0.1010* 0.0320 0.1083* 0.0356* 
CDHP -0.0048*** 0.0302*** -0.0127*** 0.0295*** -0.0110*** 0.0302*** 0.0979* 0.0532** 0.1045* 0.0587*** 
HDHP -0.0110*** 0.0325*** -0.0315*** 0.0305*** -0.0283*** 0.0325*** 0.1111* 0.0463** 0.1165* 0.0490** 
Marketshare 
(log) 
      -0.0035 -0.0062*** -0.0019 -0.0072*** 
Hourly 
Employee 
0.0059*** 0.0008* -0.0032** 0.0007 -0.0032** 0.0008*   0.0143*** -0.0121*** 
Age (log) 0.0194*** 0.0394***   0.0194*** 0.0394***   0.0057 0.0482*** 
Sex -0.0162*** 
 













     0.0730    0.0780 
 
Cons -3.7935*** -7.4944*** -3.3087*** 
 
-1.5224*** -3.8312*** -7.9081*** -3.4032*** -1.5466*** -3.7938*** -7.3254*** 














1. The cancer drug market obeys few economic principles.   
2. Prices for single source US cancer drugs rose sharply from 2010 to 2014, with 
AWP increasing 76%, transaction prices increasing 74%, while patient cost 
sharing increasing 29%. 
3. There was significant variation in the increases in AWP and transaction prices 
across the cancer drugs.  
4. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentile for prices increased 159% between 
2010 and 2014, widening to $474 in 2014. 
5. Plans with capitation had their transaction prices grow marginally slower than 
non-capitation plans, although the difference was not statistically significant.   
6. Four cancer drugs that transitioned to generic saw 9.4% decrease in transaction 
prices and 5-fold increase in dispersion 
7. For each additional manufacturer participating in the multi-source cancer drug 
market, utilization increases 15.5% and prices surprisingly increase by 3.6%.  
8. After controlling for cost, a 10% change in price dispersion increases utilization 
by 1.1%, suggesting price discrimination in the US cancer drug market can 





 This chapter uses longitudinal data to quantify pricing trends of US cancer drug 
market and assesses the relationship between price discrimination and access.  The prices 
for antineoplastic agents therapeutic class drugs in a large commercial claims database 
from 2010-2014 are analyzed.  For single source drugs, Average Wholesale Price 
increased 76%, transaction prices paid increased 74%, and patient cost sharing increased 
29%.  For multi-source drugs, the AWP increased only 6% while transaction price 
increased 93%.  These results are surprising and reflect the fact that cancer drug prices do 
not follow basic economic principles. A more nuanced analysis suggests that a few 
cancer drugs distort the relationship between AWP and transaction price growth and are 
responsible for the anomalies. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentile paid for a 
single source cancer drug increased from $183 to $474 suggesting increased dispersion. 
For multi-source, the gap increased from $37 to $55.  Plans with capitation grew 4.3% 
annually while non-capitated plans saw prices paid increase 5.7%. 
 This study uses a linear mixed methods regression model with random effects and 
cluster variable around drug to analyze the impact of price discrimination in the US 
cancer drug market.  Results for branded drugs suggest a 10% increase in price dispersion 
is associated with a utilization increase of 1.1%.  For multi-source drugs, the association 
of price dispersion and utilization was similar, but not statistically significant.  Within the 
multi-source market, each additional manufacturer is associated with a 15.5% increase in 





 Researchers have documented price dispersion for pharmaceuticals across 
countries212 213 and within countries.214 215  This price dispersion has been attributed to 
pharmaceutical company’s ability to price discriminate.  Economists define price 
discrimination as the ability of a firm to set different prices for the same product.  This 
can only occur under three necessary conditions:216  
1. A firm must be able to act as a price setter, such that an individual firm’s 
demand curve is downward sloping akin to an aggregate market demand curve 
2. A firm must control the sale of its product 
3. A firm must be able to sort consumers by their demand (different demand 
elasticities for a drug) 
The previous chapters have provided background and discussion of price discrimination 
in the US cancer drug market.  In Chapter 2, there is a discussion on the current literature 
on price discrimination and a conceptual model relating the five key actors in the US 
cancer drug market (patients, payers, physicians, drug manufacturers, and the 
government).  Chapter 3 uses the conceptual model developed in Chapter 2 and theories 
on price discrimination in markets with imperfect competition to empirically analyze a 
US commercial claims database for price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  
The results of Chapter 3 suggest evidence for price discrimination.  This chapter builds 
upon this prior work by quantifying pricing trends in the US cancer drug market and 
assessing the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  These goals 
                                                          
212 Danzon, P. M., & Chao, L. W. (2000).  
213 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010).  
214 Frank, R. G. (2001).  
215 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010).  
216 Varian, H. R. (1989). 
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are motivated by current research on pricing trends in the US cancer drug market and 
research on the impact of price discrimination. 
 High drug prices have been discussed much recently by policy makers and 
researchers alike; and cancer drugs are no exception.  Several researchers have suggested 
that cancer drug prices in the US are exceptionally high with little association with the 
value of the drug.217 218  This is shown in the prior chapter. Other researchers have also 
observed an upward trend in cancer drug prices.219  Researchers have examined pricing 
trends based on average wholesale price (AWP), transaction price, and wholesale 
acquisition cost.  Much of the research has been descriptive focusing on pricing trends; 
there have been both quantitative and qualitative attempts to explain the increased price 
trend of cancer drugs.  
 Howard et al suggest that the price trend is related to “reference pricing”, which 
stipulates that the price of each new drug is based on existing drug prices plus a 
premium.220  They also speculate that the price trend does not have a demand side 
(increase demand for cancer drugs) or supply side (fewer sellers of drugs) response.  This 
chapter will add to current research by examining price trends for cancer drugs. It will 
also examine other trends including changes in price dispersion, difference between AWP 
and transaction price, gap between the 10th and 90th percentile of prices for the same drug, 
utilization, and changes to supply manufacturers in the 2010 to 2014 time period.  These 
results will serve as the foundation for the assessment of the longitudinal impact of price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market. 
                                                          
217 Elkin, E. B., & Bach, P. B. (2010).  
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 For economists, price discrimination invokes judgment based on the impact on 
welfare.  Welfare is a measurement of the utility a particular good or service provides, 
and typically measured in currency units such as dollars. 221  Currency, including dollars, 
provides researchers a measurement of value that is assumed indifferent between 
individuals versus corporations since both value dollars.  This allows a measurement of 
welfare that can aggregate both the producer surplus (i.e. price sold and cost) and the 
consumer surplus (i.e. difference between price paid and willingness to pay).  In general, 
according to some economists, if price discrimination increases output, then it increases 
welfare.222   
While price discrimination may improve welfare by increasing output according 
to economists, it is not a Pareto optimal improvement since some consumers will be 
worse off as their consumer surplus is transferred to the producer.   
Moving from theory to the drug market, Danzon,223 Lichtenberg,224 and Malueg 
and Schwartz225 all have argued that price discrimination improves welfare.  The crux of 
their argument is price discrimination enables drug manufacturers to enter markets that 
normally would have market prices below a pharmaceutical’s uniform market price.  
They reason that pharmaceuticals need prices high enough to recoup the relatively large 
fixed costs associated with the research and development of pharmaceuticals. In a 
uniform pricing market, prices that are high enough to incentivize research and 
development would be too high for many markets, thereby limiting output and welfare.  
                                                          
221 Arrow, K. (1962). 
222 Danzon, P. M. (1997). 
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224 Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). 
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The implication that output is related to welfare is crucial for policy makers since 
increased output may suggest improved access; this will be further discussed. 
Most of this discussion of the welfare gain associated with price discrimination is 
in the international context, with markets being defined by countries.  Despite 
suggestions of price discrimination in the US, there is little economic analysis on whether 
price discrimination is good or bad in the US.  With that said, one could argue that 
differential prices benefit society by allowing budget sensitive purchasers such as 
Medicaid or the Veterans Administration access to drugs at lower prices than other 
purchasers thereby suggesting improved access.  However, not all groups benefit under 
differential pricing in the US, notably the uninsured who pay the highest prices in the 
US.226   
For US policy makers, access is a major concern; whether US patients can access 
appropriate drugs and treatments.  This concern has underpinned many of the major 
health policies in the US, such as the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act.  This is a 
different concern from the economist’s view of welfare gains. Whether price 
discrimination in the US cancer drug market improves access by allowing cancer drugs to 
be more favorably placed on formularies is the main criterion for assessing the impact of 
price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  Secondary to access, policy makers 
are also concerned with the equity and fairness of price discrimination in the US cancer 
drug market.  Under price discrimination, some patients either through premiums or co-
pays will pay more than other patients.  This should be a significant concern for policy 
                                                          
226 Frank, R. G. (2001).  
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makers especially within the US where significant inequities exist227 and health plans are 
typically tied to employment that restricts patient choice.   
In Chapter 3, results shown the difference between the 10th and 90th price paid in 
single source drugs is $300 and >$500 for many high priced drugs.  For policy makers it 
is important to know if price dispersion is static or growing?  Are certain health plan 
types more consistently accessing lower prices?  Both questions are motivated by 
concerns of inequity under price discrimination.  Price discrimination also raises 
questions on fairness since it represents a transfer of consumer surplus to drug companies 
in the form of higher profits.  This welfare transfer needs to be contrasted against 
increased access.      
 This chapter quantifies pricing trends in the US cancer drug market.  By 
quantifying trends, the chapter highlights areas that are of concern for policy makers.  
The trends also provide data to test for increased utilization (as noted earlier, a proxy for 
welfare improvement) associated with price discrimination.  Trends analyzed include 
changes in the AWP, total transaction price, cost sharing of patients, the gap between the 
10th and 90th percentile of prices paid for the same drug, and levels of price dispersion 
and discounts for US cancer drugs in the US cancer drug market.  The project will then 
use these pricing trends to assess the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market.  This will be done by analyzing changes in price dispersion and associated 
changes to drug utilization in the US cancer drug market.  The primary hypothesis is that 
price discrimination is associated with utilization of cancer drugs in the US commercially 
insured market.  In addition, the study examined four secondary hypotheses.  These are: 
                                                          
227 Davis, K., & Ballreich, J. (2014).  
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1. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentile price paid for a drug will increase.   
2. Health plans with capitation will see slower rates of price increases. 
3. Following the transition from branded to generic drugs, cancer drugs will lower 
their prices, have greater dispersion, and increased use.  
4. For generic cancer drugs, an increase in number of participating manufacturers 
will be associated with lower prices, higher dispersion, and increased utilization. 
The primary and four secondary hypotheses will be tested with regression models using 
commercial claims database from 2010-2014.  The results and policy implications will be 
discussed. 
4.3 Data 
The study quantifies pricing trends in the US cancer drug market and uses these 
trends to assess the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  The 
data is from the Truven Health MarketScan® Research Database (MarketScan®) from 
2010 to 2014 supplemented with Truven Health Red Book®.  MarketScan® contains 
insurance claims for nearly 66 million Americans who have employer-sponsored health 
insurance.  The key data file from the MarketScan® database was the drug outpatient 
claims data file.  The Red Book® file provided additional information regarding drug 
manufacturers on cancer drugs.  Additional discussion of the analytic file is in Chapter 3.  
 Cancer drugs and their corresponding National Drug Codes (NDCs) were 
identified using the antineoplastic therapeutic class indicators (therapeutic classes: 21, 
251, 260, 261, 262, and 263) within the Red Book® data set.  The NDCs were matched 
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to the MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims, and drugs were excluded if they had less 
than 100 observations and less than $1 million in sales over the study time period.  
 The drugs were categorized as “single source” or “multi-source” or “new 
generics”.  Single source where drugs that were either branded, which meant they were 
patented or had marketed exclusivity, or the drugs were single source generics and faced 
no generic competition.  Multi-source includes both multi-source generics and single 
source brands with generics.  For “single source” and “multi source” designations were 
based on their generic indicator in Red Book®.  The “new generics” included four drugs 
that started as branded drugs, but lost market protection during the study time period.  
These four were exemestane (generic approved April 2011228), anastrozole (generic 
approved June 2010229), letrozole (generic approved June 2011230), and capecitabine 
(generic approved September 2013231).  These four drugs provide a unique situation to 
temporally test the relationship between loss of market protection, price discrimination, 
and changes to price and utilization.  Across the full sample, there were 62 unique drugs; 
112 unique drugs when considering different dosages and forms. 
 The MarketScan® Outpatient Drug claims provide detail for each prescription 
claim by enrollee.  The claim lists the service date NDC, Average Wholesale Price 
(AWP), number of units dispensed, payment from the insurer, payment from the enrollee, 
and other variables.  Similar to the analysis in Chapter 3, an AWP per unit variable was 
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created. The AWP price serves to define the reference unit. The variable of interest is the 
price dispersion for each drug, akin to the key dependent variable in Chapter 3, but 
adjusted for the longitudinal nature of the data.  Drug was defined by the generic 
indicator, which indicates bioequivalent drug.  For single source drugs, each dose had its 
own generic indicator, regardless if they were branded or single source generic.  For 
multi-source drugs, the generic indicator linked all the generically equivalent NDCs. 
Price dispersion was calculated as the coefficient of variation of transaction prices 
within the AWP per unit transactions defined in Chapter 3.  This variable was 
transformed to adjust for the longitudinal nature of the data using Equation 1.  The price 
dispersion variable was averaged across all transactions for drug i during month t. 






The dependent variable is utilization that is based on the total number of fills for each 
drug i during month t.  The variable was calculated using MarketScan® Outpatient Drug 
claims with Equation 2. 
EQ 2  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 
For quantifying the price trends and answering the secondary hypotheses, several 
other variables were created using the analytic file.  There were five price variables of 
interest.  These variables include AWP, transaction price, patients cost sharing, prices paid 
by plans with capitation, and prices paid by plans without capitation.  All five price 
variables were calculated as the average across each transaction for each drug i during 
month t.  Health plans were categorized as plans with capitation for based on the plan 
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type.  Plans that were considered Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or Point-of-
Service (POS) plans with capitation were considered plans with capitation; the remaining 
plans were considered not capitation.  A discussion of the plan types is in Chapter 3.   
These five price variables were of interest because they reflect prices paid by the 
two main consumers for in the US cancer drug market: the health plan and the patient.  
AWP was included because prices paid are ultimately discounted off of the AWP.  It is a 
price that is the starting point for all negotiations and does not vary by market. The prices 
paid by health plans were of interest because there is a growing trend of declining market 
share by health maintenance organizations (the primary plan with capitation).232  Given 
that HMOs tend to have higher premiums but more generous coverage, this trend could 
result in growing inequity in the quality of coverage of people covered by employer-
sponsored insurance.   
 There were two calculations for the price trends of the five variables of interest.  
The first method was to look at average prices in the first half of 2010 and compare that 
to the average prices in the second half of 2014.  This method does not take into 
consideration changes to the market basket of drugs. Because drugs enter and exit the 
market and because price could affect the demand for drugs, this is an imperfect 
comparison.  The second, alternative method, was to look at price trends based on 
average monthly changes.  The average monthly change in price would then be 
compounded over 12 months to determine an average annual price change.  The second 
method is known as the adjusted price trend and described in Equation 3. 
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𝑇 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
Both methods have benefits and drawbacks.  The unadjusted price trend will be 
more applicable to patients and health plans as they would focus on the bottom line of 
drug spending.  However, the price change for the full sample could be biased since the 
drugs in the first half of 2010 lineup are different from the drugs in the second half of 
2014.  The adjusted price trend takes into consideration the change in the cancer drug 
sample.  The adjusted price trend is calculated by averaging the monthly price change for 
each drug.  The average monthly price change is compounded to estimate the annualized 
change.  This method weighs each drug equally whether the drug entered the market from 
2013-2014 or was on the market throughout the entire study sample since it calculates the 
annualized price change on average monthly price changes.  The adjusted price trend 
addresses the bias in the first method.  Table 4.1 presents results for the unadjusted and 
adjusted price trends. 
The other key variable for of interest is the number of distinct manufacturers per 
drug per month.  This variable was created by linking the MarketScan® Outpatient Drug 
claims to Red Book® using each transactions NDC.  The Red Book® file provided the 
responsible manufacturer for each NDC.  This allowed for a count of unique 
manufacturers for each drug (defined by generic indicator) for each month.  This variable 
is of interest because prior research has suggested an association between prices and 
number of manufacturers within the generic drug industry.233  This project will go beyond 
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prior research by looking at the role of the number of manufacturers and not only price 
but also dispersion and utilization.  Note that this analysis is only conducted in the multi-
source drug sample since by definition single source drugs all have one manufacturer.  
4.4 Methods 
 The primary null hypothesis is that price discrimination is unrelated to changes in 
utilization cancer drugs in the US commercially insured market.  This hypothesis 
examines whether price discrimination increases utilization and by extension access.  
Additionally, under the assumption that an increase in output increases welfare, the 
rejection of the primary hypothesis would suggest that price discrimination increases 
welfare within the US cancer drug market.  To test this hypothesis, the study will take 
advantage of the longitudinal nature of the dataset.  Specifically, it will measure 
utilization as number of monthly fills for each drug.  This dependent variable will be 
regressed against variables for price dispersion (proxy for price discrimination), price, 
percent discount to AWP, time trend, and in the case of multi-source drugs, number of 
manufacturers.  Analyses of the other variables discussed in the data section will relate to 
the four secondary hypotheses. 
 Before the testing of the primary and secondary hypotheses, data cleaning and 
variable preparation was undertaken.  For data cleaning, the same processes were used in 
this study as was described in Chapter 3.  The data cleaning addressed the outliers in the 
data.  Variable preparation included examining the distribution of variables and log 




4.4.1 Primary Hypothesis Model 
The primary hypothesis will be tested by measuring changes in fills and regress this 
outcome variable against changes in price, price dispersion, price discount, and a time 
variable to account for time trends.  The data was panel data with the time month, and id 
is generic id.  Both the use of lagged and simultaneous independent variables were 
explored.  The reasoning for using lagged independent variables was to reduce 
simultaneity bias; however, the serial correlation of the variable suggests that bias would 
still be present.  The reasoning for using simultaneous independent variables is that 
decisions on drug demand would be done concurrently with price changes.  Both models 
produced similar results, but the intuitive reasoning for using simultaneous independent 
variables with stronger than the reduction of simultaneity bias; therefore, simultaneous 
variables are shown in the tables.  Refer to Equation 4 for model.   
EQ4.  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑡𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variable is the log of fills for drug i at month t.  The independent 
variables is the log of price, log of price dispersion, and amount of price discount for drug 
i at month t.  A variable for the time trend was also included.  Clustered standard errors 
were used to account for clustering of standard errors around each drug. Random effects 
would produce different levels of standard errors for each drug, and un-clustered errors 
would bias coefficient estimates towards statistical significance.   
The model was tested for both fixed and random effects, which typically is done 
with the Hausman test, but in this case, the test used was the Sargen-Hansen test due to 
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unbalanced panel data.  The data was considered unbalanced for either new drugs 
entering the market drugs or because drugs were discontinued during this time period. 
Because there was no uniformity of which drugs are filled during each month; there was 
unbalanced panel data.   
All variables except for price discount were log transformed due to the skewness.  
The results were then untransformed through exponents for coefficient interpretation.  
For situations where the independent and dependent variable were both log transformed, 
the coefficient of the independent variable was the exponent for the corresponding 
percentage change.  For situations where the dependent variable was log transformed and 
independent variable was not, the coefficient independent variable was exponent for the 
mathematical constant e, with the results interpreted as percent change.   
As with any econometric model, there is a concern of endogeneity.  For this 
model, endogeneity may exist between the price dispersion and drug utilization.  The 
theory assumes that increased price dispersion increases utilization. However, price 
dispersion could decrease utilization if drug companies used price dispersion to counter a 
decreased demand for drug amongst select health plans.  In essence, the drug company 
could cut prices to stimulate demand if the rates of utilization of a drug for specific health 
plan were underperforming.  This is speculative, but serves as an example of possible 
endogeneity.  The sign, magnitude, and significance of the log of dispersion variable will 





4.4.2 Secondary Hypotheses Models   
The first secondary null hypothesis is that the gap between the 10th and 90th 
percentile price paid for a drug will be constant.  The measure of the gap between the 10th 
and 90th percentile price paid can be interpreted as 1) another measure of price dispersion 
and 2) a measure reflecting growing inequity.  For the former, measuring the spread is 
just another way of measuring how the price varies. However, this measure is absolute 
and not relative. Drugs with higher prices might have lower relative dispersion, but 
because of their higher prices the dollar amount of their dispersion could be greater.  For 
the latter, changes to the price gap suggest some plans are getting access to lower prices 
and other plans are not.  Plans with access to lower prices should have lower premiums 
and this will benefit enrollees.  Alternatively the health plans could retain the lower 
prices and earn additional profits.  Higher prices can result in access restrictions either 
through formulary controls or increased cost sharing of the patient.  Regressing the 
magnitude of the price gap over the study period against a time variable for single source 
and multi-source drugs separately will assess the secondary hypothesis.  It will be 
examined using the relative and absolute magnitude of the difference. The number of fills 
for each drug will serve as a weighting for the price gap.  The sign, coefficient, and 
significance of the time variable will either confirm or reject the hypothesis.   
The next secondary null hypothesis is that health plans with capitation will see no 
difference in rates of price increases versus health plans with no capitation.  As discussed 
earlier, a price between health plans with capitation versus health plans without capitation 
may suggest some enrollees have access to lower-priced drugs over time.  Price 
discrimination would allow prices to be set differently for health plans with capitation 
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versus health plans without capitation, assuming capitation would affect drug demand.  
This assumption is reasonable given previous literature on drug spending and demand by 
HMOs versus other health plan types.234   This hypothesis will be assessed by comparing 
the price trends for drugs paid by health plans with capitation versus prices paid by health 
plans without capitation over time.  A t-test will be conducted comparing the price trends 
for health plans with capitation versus health plans without capitation.  This t-test will use 
a two-sided hypothesis test to check if the trends are statistically different. 
The third secondary null hypothesis is cancer drugs that transitioned from branded 
to generic will not see differences in prices, dispersion, and use.  The intuitive reasoning 
for rejecting the null hypothesis is when a drug goes from branded to generic and more 
manufacturers enter the market, then the cross price elasticity should increase and result 
in greater dispersion.  The other two aspects of this hypothesis, i.e. lower prices and 
increased use, have been confirmed in other studies, but not specifically in the US cancer 
drug market.  This hypothesis will not be tested using statistical models but rather 
descriptive statistics for prices, dispersion, and increased utilization.  Descriptive 
statistics for each drug will be presented for the six months prior to generic entry, 
followed by six months, one year, and two years after generic entry.  A graph depicting 
changes in AWP, transaction prices, and number of unique manufacturers will be 
presented for visual analysis for the drug anastrozole. 
The last secondary hypothesis concerns multi-source cancer drugs.  The null 
hypothesis is that an increase in number of participating manufacturers is not associated 
with lower prices, higher dispersion, and increased utilization. Prior research has shown a 
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relationship between number of generic drug manufacturers and price, with the price 
effect maxing out at 8 manufacturers, but this analysis will control for other market 
factors such as price dispersion and utilization. This hypothesis will be tested by 
including a variable for the number of distinct manufacturers within each drug in the 
model for the primary hypothesis detailed in EQ 2.  The sign, coefficient, and 
significance of the time variable will either confirm or reject of the hypothesis. 
While the statistical models will test most of the proposed hypotheses, descriptive 
statistics and graphs will present pricing trends for the AWP, transaction price, cost 
sharing of patients, and price gap for the US cancer drug market 
4.5 Results 
The study quantifies trends in the US cancer drug market and assesses the impact 
of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market. Table 4.1 provides descriptive 
statistics for several important variables over time.  Table 4.2 provides the statistics for 
the unadjusted, adjusted, and by product price trends.  The added granularity of Table 4.2 
highlights the distribution of price increases across products.  Over time, there were 
significant price increases.  Using the adjusted pricing trend, 78 out of 110 drugs 
experienced positive annualized average AWP increases; 84 out of 110 drugs 
experienced positive annualized average transaction price increases.  Examining just the 
single source environment, 65 of the 87 drugs had positive AWP increases and 69 of the 
87 drugs had positive annualized average transaction price increases.  Additionally, 26 
single source drugs experienced annualized transaction price increases greater than 10%. 
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The growth of prices for single source is affirmed by prior research,235 
nonetheless, it is surprising in terms of magnitude.  Perhaps most surprising is that nearly 
a third of single source for cancer drugs experienced annualized price increases greater 
than 10%. This growth, which far exceeds inflation, could be attributable to higher costs.  
For pharmaceutical companies, the primary cost is research and development and this is a 
fixed cost.236  The R&D costs have been characterized as inherently risky.237  However, 
at the industry level, the pharmaceutical company spending on research and development 
has not gone up significantly since 2010.238 Further research is needed to explain these 
significant price increases. 
For patients, there was also an increasing trend in cost-sharing during the study 
time period.  Using unadjusted price trends, which more accurately reflect patient 
expenditures, there was an observed 29% increase in patient cost-sharing in single source 
drugs, and a smaller 9.6% increase in multi-source drugs.  There was also significant 
seasonality most likely due to patients reaching out-of-pocket deductibles.  The average 
level of cost-sharing spiked in the first two months of the year across all four years.  To 
adjust for seasonality, when calculating the overall trend year-by-year comparisons were 
made; this approach smoothed out the January and February spikes of cost-sharing.   
The relatively slow growth of the increase in cost-sharing is surprising given the 
increasing trend of more patient financial responsibility within health plan formularies.239  
                                                          
235 Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). 
236 Berndt, E. R., McGuire, T. G., & Newhouse, J. P. (2011).  
237 DiMasi, J. A., Grabowski, H. G., & Hansen, R. W. (2016).  
238 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Report, “Biopharmaceutical research 
and development: The process behind new medicines” 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf, 2015. 
239 Joyce, G. F., Escarce, J. J., Solomon, M. D., & Goldman, D. P. (2002). 
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However, the slow growth in cost-sharing may be an artifact of patients hitting their 
maximum out-of-pocket expenditures due to other healthcare services for their cancer 
diagnoses (i.e. hospitalizations).  It may also be due to coupons and other patient 
assistance programs that mitigate the cost-sharing for cancer drug prescriptions, but 
further research is needed especially using other data sets that delineate the coupons’ and 
patient assistance programs’ financial contributions to the patients’ cost-sharing 
expenditures. 
The price gap for prices paid between the 10th and 90th percentile for the same 
drug appears to have increased.  For single source drugs, the price gap increases from 
$183 to $474 representing a 159% increase.  For multi-source drugs, the price gap 
increases from $37 to $55 representing a 50% increase.  Clearly, both the absolute and 
relative growth of the price gap were greater in single source drugs.  This may suggest a 
growing willingness by drug manufacturers to price discriminate in more expensive 
drugs, and an underlying growing inequity when it comes to expensive medications.  
Of particular interest for the primary hypothesis, the level of price dispersion for 
single source drugs increased 28% during the study period.  There was also a minor 
increase in the discount between AWP and transaction price.  Contrasted to the single 
source results, the multi-source results showed a decrease in both price dispersion and 
discount between AWP and transaction price.  An increase in the transaction price 
relative to the AWP may suggest a collective increase in market power by generic cancer 
drug manufacturers.  This increase in market power would increase the price, and for 
drug companies, the transaction price better reflects the actual price rather than the AWP.  
The increase market power of multi-source cancer drugs may be due to the consolidation 
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in the generic manufacturer market or a response to higher single source drug prices 
thereby making generic alternatives more appealing to payers.  In this study sample, 
single source cancer drugs were nearly 50 times the price as multi-source drugs.  The fact 
that the AWP did not change substantially for multi-source drugs may be due to possible 
unobserved characteristics of multi-source cancer drugs or manipulation of the value of 
rebates since AWP is often used as the benchmark price for other payers’ notably state 
Medicaid programs.  
 The primary hypothesis is that price discrimination is not associated with 
utilization of cancer drugs in the US commercially insured market.  Two regression 
models were used: one with fixed effects for the drug and the other with random effects 
for the drug.  The Sargen-Hansen test indicated a Chi-square with a corresponding p-
value of <.0001 for all three models, suggesting a random effects model.  Both models 
were tested across the full sample, single source sample, and multi-source sample.   
For the full sample, the coefficient for price dispersion is .114 with a p-value of 
.001.  This tells us that a 10% increase in price dispersion is associated with a 1.1% 
increase in fills, and this value is statistically significant.  For the single source sample, 
the coefficient for price dispersion is .105 with a p-value of .001, which is estimates a 
10% increase in price dispersion is associated with a 1.0% increase in fills.  These results 
suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no association of price 
discrimination with utilization; therefore, it appears, at least in single source market, price 
discrimination of cancer drugs improves access, albeit minimally.  For the multi-source 
sample, the price dispersion coefficient increases to .236 but the p-value also increases to 
.13 suggesting no statistical significance.   
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The price and time trend are only significant in the full sample and multi-source 
subset. Specifically for the multi-source subset, a 10% increase in transaction price is 
associated with a 5.1% increase in fills.  This is counter to traditional economic theory, 
where lower prices should dictate increase in fills and not vice versa.  However, there are 
two possible explanations.  The first and most likely is that the small number of drugs in 
the multi-source cancer drug market may create perverse results if unobserved factors 
affecting specific drugs were not accounted in the model.  For example, the positive 
relationship between transaction price and fills could be due to new research on a generic 
drug in a cancer indication, and manufacturers may respond to the increasing demand 
(higher fills) with an increase in price.  The other alternative is that the multi-source 
cancer drug market competitive forces are hindered by barriers of entry and regulatory 
environment.  Howard et al suggest that normal supply and demand competitive forces do 
not work in the cancer drug market.240  Generic manufacturers can be increasing prices 
while at the same time experience increased demand due to increased cancer prevalence 
and/or increased access to treatment.  Another explanation lies in the distribution of price 
and utilization increases across multi-source drugs.  Three of the nineteen multi-source 
drugs experienced annualized price increases greater than 10%, and these three saw 
increases in utilization while the rest saw small increases or decreases (average of -0.7%).  
Further research is needed to see why these three saw big increases in price and 
utilization.    
 The study results reject the first secondary null hypothesis that the gap between 
prices paid at the 10th and 90th percentile is unchanged. For single source drugs, the gap 
                                                          
240 Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). 
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increased from $183-$474 representing 159% increase. This suggests that patients and 
some health plans will be accessing drugs at prices substantially less than other patients 
and other health plans. For policy makers, the question is whether this is equitable and 
fair especially in the US where most people are enrolled through employer-sponsored 
insurance and have little choice on health plans. 
 The other secondary hypothesis examines health plans stratified by health plans 
with capitation and plans without capitation.  The null hypothesis is that the trend in 
prices paid between these plans is not different. Plans with capitation experienced annual 
price increases of 5.9% versus plans without capitation that experienced annual price 
increases of 7.0%.  The difference of 1.1% is small but could compound significantly 
over time.  However, a t-test rejects the hypotheses that the growth rates are statistically 
different.   
 There were four cancer drugs that experience generic competition during the 
study time frame: exemestane, anastrozole, letrozole, and capecitabine.  The null 
hypothesis is that there would be no change in transaction prices, utilization, or price 
dispersion when the drugs experience generic competition.  The results of the analysis are 
in Table 4.3 and suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis.  All four of these drugs 
experience considerable decreases in transaction prices of about 9.4% in the first year 
post-generic entry.  There was also a significant increase in price dispersion for these 
drugs after generic entry.  Interestingly, two drugs had sharp decreases in utilization, 
while the other two drugs had slight increases in utilization.  A sample size of four cancer 
drugs is very limited and results can be biased due to unobserved market forces with 
these for drugs; this limits generalizability. 
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 The last secondary hypothesis examines the relationship between number of 
unique manufacturers and price and utilization in the multi-source cancer drug market.  
The null hypothesis is there is no association between the number of unique 
manufacturers and drug price or utilization.  The analyses to test this hypothesis was 
similar to the primary hypothesis model, with the exception that to test the relationship 
between the number of unique manufacturers and drug price the dependent variable of 
utilization and independent variable drug price were flipped.  Results are presented in 
Table 4.3 in the fourth column.   
The results suggest there is a positive relationship between the number of unique 
manufacturers and utilization. For each new manufacturer, utilization increases 15.4%.  
The results also suggest a positive statistically significant relationship between the 
number of unique manufacturers and price; each new manufacturer average transaction 
price increases 3.6%.  Both of these results are contrary to classic economic theory. There 
are two possible explanations of these results. First, generic drug manufacturers may 
enter markets where they perceive excess demand and upon entry satisfy the excess 
demand hence increased utilization.  Second, drug manufacturers may induce demand 
and as a result utilization and prices increase.  This argument is weaker in the generic 
drug market since specific generic drug companies do not have the type of market power 
that branded drug company would have.  The results are contrary to Frank and 
Salkever241 who found evidence suggesting more generic manufacturer’s lower prices, 
but this study was older (>20 years) and looked at multiple drug classes. 
 
                                                          




There are two important considerations when using cancer drug claims data.  
First, as with any pharmaceutical product, there’s concern about rebates, chargebacks, 
and coupons and whether the data set allows us to observe actual prices paid.  Rebates 
and chargebacks has money flowing from the drug manufacturer to the PBM and health 
plans.  Coupons can distort the patient cost-sharing and patient drug demand by reducing 
the financial incentive to purchase cheaper drug alternatives.   
Second, outliers exist, and these outliers may not be representative of the market 
and can bias results.  For example, large price spikes in select drugs or with select health 
plans can give policy makers the wrong impression on drug price trends.  The 
mechanisms to address outliers are discussed in Chapter 3.  For the methods, limitations 
inherently exist with the regression analyses.  These limitations included model 
misspecification, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity.  The model and variable 
selection could be wrongly specified, this may result in biasness in the estimates.  
Omitted variable bias is a concern, since other factors such as relative cost of non-drug 
treatments can influence drug demand via cross-price elasticities or the role of marketing 
on drug demand which has been shown to effect demand.242  Endogeneity may exist in 
the relationship between prices and quantity, which economists tend to encounter.  A 
benefit for using single source cancer drugs is that these drugs have significant market 
power and the drug manufacturer can be reasonably assumed to be a price setter.  
Therefore, the relationship between quantity and price is not set simultaneous in the 
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market, rather, prices are set and then the market demand responds.  This dynamic is also 
related to simultaneous bias, and could be more influential in the multi-source market.      
 The last notable limitation is the limited generalizability of the US cancer drug 
market to either other therapeutic classes the US or other countries.  Cancer is a 
devastating disease and can be considered either acute or chronic depending on the 
clinical situation.  Other entities, notably the National Institute of Clinical Excellence in 
England has recognized the uniqueness of the cancer drug market and proscribes cancer 
drug specific regulations.   
 
4.7 Policy Implications 
The chapter produced two sets of analyses: quantifying trends in the US cancer 
drug market and assessing the impact of price discrimination.  Both have policy 
implications.  For the trend data, the study confirms previous studies243 that have 
highlighted significant price increases for single source drugs.  These price increases far 
exceeded normal inflation and contribute to the broader discussion of high drug prices in 
the US.   
Beyond validating previous studies, this chapter draws awareness to other 
concerning trends in the US cancer drug market.  First, for single source drugs the gap 
between the 90th and 10th percentile of prices paid for the same drug has widened at a 
greater rate than transaction prices and AWP. This suggests that the gap between those 
who have access to lower drug prices versus those who have access to high drug prices 
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may be widening. It is important to consider this inequity in the context of the US health 
insurance market.  Most health insurance is provided through employer-sponsored 
insurance, and this may limit for an individual’s choice of different health insurance 
plans.  Further analysis in terms of who has access to lower premiums should be 
conducted, but this was beyond the scope of this project.  
Within the multi-source market, prices measured by AWP have stayed reasonably 
flat in US cancer drugs. However, transaction prices have increased. This study did find 
the reason for the increase, but a possible explanation may lie in with the lack of 
disclosure of rebates to either PBM or pharmacy, which would be more likely in 
competitive markets like the multi-source market.  These negotiations are hidden behind 
confidentiality rules. The growth of the transaction price may indeed reflect a growth in 
the rebate and growing share of the price going to PBMs.  This may warrant policy 
makers to investigate rebates in the multi-source market for two reasons.  First, 
investigate whether rebates lead to price increases, and second, investigate whether more 
cancer drug revenue is going to PBMs and what added-value warrants this growth. 
For policy makers, an interesting finding is the relationship between 
manufacturers participating and utilization.  For each additional manufacturer, utilization 
goes up 15%, even when controlling for price changes.  For now the result is that for each 
additional manufacturer average transaction prices go up 3.9%.  Further research should 
look at these results and replicate the methods and other therapeutic classes, since the 
results are contrary to classical supply and demand theory and previous research.  If these 
results hold up, then policy makers should consider what characteristics of the multi-
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source market are hindering the expected market forces such that new manufacturers 
drive transaction prices down. 
 The study rejected the primary null hypothesis; this study suggests that price 
discrimination increases utilization, which was confirmed in the single source drugs 
albeit a very small magnitude.  The results suggest a 10% increase in price dispersion 
increases utilization by 1.1%.  However, it is important to consider this magnitude in the 
relatively low levels of price dispersion in single source cancer drugs.  
 Average level of price dispersion for single source cancer drugs is nearly 6% 
compared to a nearly 40% level of price dispersion for multi-source cancer drugs.  A 10% 
increase in price dispersion would only increase price dispersion for single source cancer 
drugs to just 6.6%.  A 100%, 200% or even 300% increase in price dispersion would still 
result in a lower level of price dispersion for single source versus multi-source cancer 
drugs.  However, increasing price dispersion by multiple factors will further exacerbate 
the “winners” i.e. health plans and enrollees of these plans that access lower prices, and 
“losers” i.e. health plans and enrollees of these plans that access higher prices. 
  For example, as shown in Chapter 3, imatinib had an average price dispersion 
level of .05, assuming a linear relationship between price dispersion and utilization, if the 
maker of imatinib would double price dispersion by charging less to some plans and 
charging more for other plans, then utilization could go up 11% but the price gap would 
increase to over $1000.  For policy makers, at first this result may seem to support 
policies to encourage differential pricing in the US, but increases in dispersion inevitably 
result in inequity.  Also, the small magnitude and suggestive evidence that chargebacks 
and rebates are low in branded cancer drugs, weakens the anti-transparency efforts. 
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Companies argue against transparency since secretive contracts allow some health plans 
to better “negotiate” lower prices.   
4.8 Conclusion 
 Single source cancer drugs in the US experience considerable price increases in 
multiple facets of the price from 2010 to 2014.  These price trends affected health plans 
and patients through higher co-pays.  These trends were less in magnitude and statistical 
significance for the multi-source cancer drug market. The gap in prices paid grew 
significantly during the study time period.  The study confirms that price discrimination 
may increase access to single source cancer drugs in the US market albeit at a small 
magnitude of effect.  Further research should examine who benefits from these trends, 
causality of the trends, and whether these methods can be applied to other therapeutic 
classes beyond cancer.  
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 
























AWP (S2) 4078 4409 4718 5194 5842 6068 6438 6699 6745 7179 76.0% 
AWP (M) 136 135 135 134 134 132 132 133 136 143 5.5% 
Price (S) 3503 3796 4039 4442 4991 5181 5476 5673 5742 6100 74.2% 
Price (M) 37 36 36 35 34 37 51 73 71 71 92.5% 
Patient Co-
Pay (S) 3 
99 73 114 82 121 81 116 79 138 84 29.0% 
Patient Co-
Pay (M) 
13 12 13 12 13 12 14 14 15 12 9.6% 
Price Gap 10-
90 (S) 
183 192 203 249 288 292 321 395 440 474 159.1% 
Price Gap 10-
90 (M) 








30.8% 27.8% 37.4% 34.3% 27.8% 34.9% 50.0% 36.1% 19.4% 33.5% -9.6% 
Price 
Discount (S) 
13.8% 13.5% 14.4% 13.9% 14.3% 14.1% 15.0% 14.9% 14.3% 14.8% 6.3% 
Price 
Discount (M) 
23.7% 45.8% 59.7% 62.5% 43.0% 55.8% 55.8% 45.5% 26.4% 35.6% -10.8% 
All variables are in US $ unless otherwise noted. 
1. 1H=1st Half, variables are averaged from Jan-Jun 
2. S indicates Single Source, M indicates Multi-Source  
3. Patient co-pay increases were calculated by comparing average across the first and 
fifth years 






Table 4.2 Adjusted and Unadjusted Price Trends 
Single Source Multi Source 
 AWP PAY  AWP PAY 
Unadjusted 
Annual Change (%) 
12% 11.7% 
Unadjusted 





Adjusted Annual  
Change (%) 
3.8% 9.1% 
      
By product   By product   
AFINITOR 8.7% 8.6% BICALUTAMIDE -2.7% -4.1% 
AVASTIN -4.3% -4.7% CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE -3.8% 5.6% 
BOSULIF -2.8% -3.8% ETOPOSIDE 8.7% 5.2% 
CAPRELSA 4.8% 4.3% LEUPROLIDE ACETATE -13.1% -4.5% 
COMETRIQ 36.5% 43.5% MEGESTROL ACETATE 1.6% 1.2% 
ERIVEDGE 0.4% 0.6% MERCAPTOPURINE 3.1% 0.6% 
FARESTON 16.5% 16.2% METHOTREXATE -1.8% 21.5% 
GILOTRIF -0.1% 2.0% METHOTREXATE NA 9.5% 22.2% 
GLEEVEC 14.5% 14.1% TAMOXIFEN CITRATE -3.3% 0.5% 
HERCEPTIN 12.1% 10.2% TEMODAR 50.1% 61.0% 
HYCAMTIN -10.1% -7.5% TEMOZOLOMIDE -6.1% -9.7% 
ICLUSIG 18.6% 22.2%    
IMBRUVICA -5.4% -7.7%    
INLYTA 2.4% 3.2%    
LUPANETA PACK 0.0% 1.1%    
LUPRON DEPOT 6.7% 7.0%    
MATULANE -7.2% -7.5%    
MEGACE ES 6.6% 6.3%    
MEKINIST 4.8% 6.3%    
NEXAVAR 9.0% 8.5%    
POMALYST 4.6% 5.6%    
RITUXAN 5.9% 5.6%    
SPRYCEL 6.9% 7.1%    
STIVARGA 4.3% 4.3%    
SUTENT 12.7% 12.6%    
TAFINLAR 3.8% 3.2%    
TARCEVA 11.5% 11.7%    
TARGRETIN 31.5% 41.5%    
TASIGNA 4.6% 4.5%    
TEMODAR 12.9% 11.8%    
TEMOZOLOMIDE -32.1% -44.2%    
TREXALL 7.7% 6.4%    
TYKERB 8.6% 8.1%    
VALCHLOR 86.0% 84.0%    
VELCADE -17.6% -18.9%    
VOTRIENT 7.5% 7.3%    
XALKORI 10.1% 10.6%    
XTANDI 4.5% 4.2%    
ZELBORAF -1.6% -1.9%    
ZOLINZA 10.2% 10.1%    
ZYKADIA 2.8% 2.6%    
ZYTIGA 10.4% 10.6%    
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Table 4.3: Primary Hypothesis Model Results 
 Full Sample Single Source Multi-Source Multi-Source 
w/Manufacturer 
     
Log Price  .206* -.029 .507*** .419*** 
Log Dispersion .114***  .105*** .236 .231 
Discount -.358 -1.692 .278 .221 
Time trend 
(month) 
-.006* .0004 -.014*** -.013*** 
Constant 6.425*** 4.150** 12.211*** 10.913*** 
Number of 
Manu. 
   1.039*** 
     
Model 
Diagnoses 
    
R2 within .042 .012 .210 .264 
R2 between .162 .155 .030 .134 
R2 overall .165 .055 .105 .107 
Wald Chi2  18.29*** 10.82** 18.44*** 18.11*** 
     
Observations 4,761 3,399 1,062 1,062 
Test Statistics are based on clustered standard errors around generic product ID (generid) 
















EXEMESTANE AWP ($) 899.09 907.53 905.82 958.37 
 
Trans Price 
($) 674.92 627.30 566.65 574.96 
 Price Disp. 0.06 0.17 0.21 0.27 
 
No. of 
Manuf. 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Fills 2331.50 2441.57 2709.69 2675.23 
ANASTROZOLE AWP ($) 879.59 868.14 911.20 911.27 
 
Trans Price 
($) 748.11 673.27 632.82 560.72 
 Price Disp. 0.06 0.37 0.58 0.56 
 
No. of 
Manuf. 1.00 13.29 15.54 15.69 
 Fills 11561.67 8940.14 4774.15 2454.54 
LETROZOLE AWP ($) 907.65 910.90 908.13 971.71 
 
Trans Price 
($) 669.38 609.83 560.02 592.51 
 Price Disp. 0.08 0.29 0.62 0.75 
 
No. of 
Manuf. 1.00 8.71 10.23 10.23 
 Fills 8921.83 5877.00 3398.15 2293.23 
CAPECITABINE AWP ($) 960.08 983.10 999.33 - 
 
Trans Price 
($) 574.84 607.82 625.15 - 
 Price Disp. 0.05 0.05 0.13 - 
 
No. of 
Manuf. 1.00 1.00 2.50 - 














The thesis examines current literature on price discrimination in the US cancer 
drug market; developed a conceptual model relating the five key actors of the US drug 
market and price discrimination; evaluated evidence for the presence and type of price 
discrimination; empirically tested the conceptual model; quantified pricing trends in the 
US cancer drug market; and assessed the impact of price discrimination in the US cancer 
drug market.  
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of price discrimination in the US cancer drug 
market.    A brief discussion of the theory is followed by a structured literature review. 
These articles discuss the relationship between price discrimination and market power; 
the relationship between the five key actors (patient, payer, physician, manufacturer, and 
government) and demand for drugs; and the pricing of cancer drugs.  Results from these 
articles provides the basis of a conceptual model that depicts the interaction between the 
five key actors and price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  Four largest 
associations are 1) the ability of pharmaceutical firms to segment the market and engage 
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in price discrimination, 2) the ability of pharmaceutical firms to have market power and 
engage in price discrimination, 3) how health plan characteristics can contribute to 
market segmentation, and 4) how drug characteristics influence the level of price 
discrimination.  These establish a framework for empirical analysis conducted in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the US cancer drug market for evidence of price 
discrimination and empirically examines demand factors depicted by the conceptual 
model of chapter 2.  Theory suggests price discrimination in markets with imperfect 
competition are characterized with increasing levels of price dispersion as the market 
becomes more competitive up until firms no longer hold market power.  Using this 
theory, price dispersion is examined in single source and multi-source cancer drug 
markets in the US. In the single source market, smaller discounts (14.7% versus 60%) 
and smaller levels of dispersion (5.6% versus 43%) are observed relative to the multi-
source market.  The smaller discounts validate the assumed lower level of competition in 
the single source versus multisource market. However, because of the higher prices of 
single source drugs the absolute levels of price dispersion are greater in the single source 
drugs.   
Chapter 4 uses longitudinal data to quantify pricing trends of US cancer drug 
market and assesses the relationship between price discrimination and access.  This 
chapter uses the same large commercial claims database from Chapter 3.  For single 
source drugs in 2010-2014, Average Wholesale Price (AWP) increased 76%, transaction 
prices paid increased 74%, and patient cost-sharing increased 29%.  For multi-source 
drugs, the AWP increased only 6% while transaction price increased 93%.  This is due 
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primarily to a few drugs that had rapid increases in the transaction price. The gap 
between the 10th and 90th percentile paid for a branded cancer drug increased from $183 
to $474 suggesting increased dispersion.  Plans with capitation grew 4.3% annually while 
non-capitated plans saw prices paid increase 5.7%.  Using panel models with random 
effects, results suggest that a 10% increase in price dispersion is associated with a 
utilization increase of 1.1% in single source drugs.  For multi-source drugs, the 
association of price dispersion and utilization was similar but not statistically significant.  
Uniquely for the multi-source market, each additional manufacturer is associated with a 
15.5% increase in utilization.  Dispersion is the result of price discrimination, and 
evidence suggests it increases access, albeit as a small effect. 
5.2 Study Limitations 
The thesis has several limitations.  First, a literature review could have missed critical 
articles and understanding price discrimination in the US cancer drug market due to the 
wrong search strategy or overlooking the abstracts during the screening process.  Some of 
the results of the literature review were based in international markets or drug market 
outside of cancer drug market.  These results may not applicable and were incorrectly 
synthesized to the conceptual model.  The conceptual model was simplified to include 
five key actors of the US drug market however the simplification omitted other entities 
involved.  These include pharmaceutical benefit management (PBM) companies, 
wholesalers, and pharmacies.  The relationship between these omitted entities and price 
discrimination may distort the results.   
 Chapter 3 uses a theoretical foundation as the basis of the primary hypothesis for 
the presence of price discrimination in the US cancer drug market.  The theories by 
131 
 
Borenstein244 and Holmes245 may incorrect or inapplicable to the US cancer drug market.  
The empirical analysis uses a large commercial claims database.  There are two important 
considerations when using cancer drug claims data.  First, as with any pharmaceutical 
product, there is a concern about rebates, chargebacks, and coupons and whether the data 
set observes actual prices paid.  Rebates and chargebacks represent money flowing from 
the drug manufacturer to the PBM and health plans.  Coupons can distort the patient cost-
sharing and patient drug demand by reducing the financial incentive to purchase cheaper 
drug alternatives.  Second, outliers exist, and these outliers may not be representative of 
the market and can bias results.  For example, large price spikes in select drugs or with 
select health plans can give policy makers the wrong impression on drug price trends.  
The mechanisms to address outliers are discussed in Chapter 3.  
 Both Chapters 3 and 4 use regression analysis to evaluate the hypotheses.  
Regression analysis has inherent weaknesses including the wrong model specification, 
omitted variable bias, and endogeneity. All of these can bias the results both sides 
magnitude of the coefficients as well as statistical significance. 
 The last notable limitation is the limited generalizability of the US cancer drug 
market to either other therapeutic classes the US or other countries. Other entities, 
notably the National Institute of Clinical Excellence in England has recognized the 
uniqueness of the cancer drug market and proscribes cancer drug specific regulations.   
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5.3 Study Strengths 
 The thesis has several study strengths.  First, the thesis begins with a structured 
literature review that errs on more generalness rather than specificity with the search 
strategy.  As evident in the number of identified articles in the initial screening, this 
strategy minimizes the risk of missing articles.  Another study strength was with the 
development of the conceptual model.  Most of the relationships were already clearly 
defined in literature, which reduce the need to speculate on the associations between the 
five key actors and price discrimination in the US cancer drug market. 
 The empirical analysis of the thesis has several strengths.  The primary data 
source is the Truven Health MarketScan® Research Database (MarketScan®) from 2010 
to 2014.  This database is professionally collected and managed.  The database is also 
large, representing nearly 66 million Americans with employer-sponsored health 
insurance.  While the database is not geographically weighted using standard survey 
techniques, there is significant geographic variation in observations.  Another benefit of 
the database is the longitudinal nature.  By examining multiple years of the US cancer 
drug market, the thesis was able to test multiple dynamics and not just rely on cross-
sectional analysis.  Lastly, using a variety of methods including univariate analysis, 
regression analysis, and graphical analysis, the thesis provides several different ways to 






5.4 Policy Implications 
Results from the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 provide evidence that price 
discrimination exists and the US cancer drug market.  Danzon,246 Lichtenberg,247 and 
Malueg and Schwartz248 all have argued that price discrimination in pharmaceuticals 
improves welfare.  The crux of their argument is price discrimination enables drug 
manufacturers to enter markets that normally would have market prices below a 
pharmaceutical’s uniform market price.  They reason that pharmaceuticals need prices 
high enough to recoup the relatively large fixed costs associated with primarily the 
research and development of pharmaceuticals. In a uniform pricing market, prices that are 
high enough to incentivize research and development will be too high for many markets, 
thereby limiting output and welfare.  The implication that output is related to welfare is 
crucial for policy makers since increased output may suggest improved access.  
 The analysis in Chapter 4, does suggest that price discrimination increases access 
in the single source drug market.  However, this result carries two key caveats.  First, the 
analysis suggest a relationship in which a 10% increase in dispersion, a proxy for price 
discrimination, increases utilization by 1.1%.  This is not a significant magnitude.  While 
the small magnitude affirms the notion of price discrimination improves access, it may 
not warrant major support for price discrimination by policy makers.  The second caveat 
is that price discrimination exists because of imperfect competition in the marketplace.  
Policymakers are partially responsible for imperfect competition through enactment of 
policies that hinders the free-market.  For example, the US has enacted the Prescription 
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Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of 1987, which significantly limits arbitrage in the US drug 
market.  This law limits the resale of drugs to wholesalers, stipulates wholesale 
regulations, and further directs state governments to regulate wholesalers.249  The PDMA 
also prevents re-importation of pharmaceuticals; therefore, preventing trans-geographic 
market transactions.  Arbitrage is necessary in markets to improve efficiency, which 
drives lower prices.  Trans-geographic drug trade also has been suggested as a means to 
lower the price of drugs.250   
 Another policy restricting competition in the US cancer drug market is the 
granting of market protections, either market exclusivities or patents.  Pharmaceutical 
development is a costly business that requires significant investments in research and 
development.251  Market protections are in place to incentivize the research and 
development; however, these protections prevent competitors from creating an identical 
drug.  The lack of other companies from entering a market with true substitutes is the 
primary reason branded drugs are so high priced relative to generics. 
 The results suggest price discrimination slightly increases utilization.  Above, two 
caveats on this statement were discussed.  In addition to these caveats, policymakers 
should be concerned about who is better off and worse off because of price 
discrimination.  Price discrimination involves the transfer of consumer surplus to the drug 
manufacturer in the form of higher profits.  This transfer leaves consumers, whether they 
are patients or health plans, worse off.  Since price discrimination involves differential 
prices, under any price discrimination scheme, some consumers pay more while other 
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consumers pay less.  Analysis in Chapter 3 suggests some health-plans pay more than 
others and the middle age (26-45) pay the most for single source drugs.  The gaps are 
more significant in terms of relative differences the multi-source market.  In Chapter 4, 
the trends suggest greater dispersion as the gap between the 10th percentile and 90th 
percentile has increased over the study time frame. 
 Evidence suggests price discrimination exists in the US cancer drug market.  
Researchers and policy makers alike should be aware of differential prices for cancer 






Supplementary Table 1 
SOURCE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
MarketScan® Outpatient 
Drug claims 
ENROLID Enrollee ID used to link 
enrollees to outpatient 
claims 
 SVCDATE Service date indicates day 
of prescription payment 
 NDCNUM National drug code links to 
red book 
 PAY Pay represents transaction 
amount 
 NETPAY Net pay represents 
transaction amount from 
health plan 
 AWP Average wholesale price 
 PLANKEY Plan key is used to estimate 
market size 
 PLANTYP Plan type describes health 
plan type 
 AGE Age of enrollee 
 SEX Sex of enrollee 
 EMPLOYECLAS Employment classification 
of enrollee 





 DX1 Primary diagnoses listed by 
outpatient provider, used to 
identify cancer type 
 DX2 Secondary diagnoses listed 
by outpatient provider, used 
to identify cancer type 
Red Book® NDCNUM ** 
 GENIND Generic indicator indicates 
if the drug is branded, multi 
source generic, etc. 
 GENERID Generic ID indicates NDC’s 
that are therapeutically 
equivalent 
 PRODNME Product name for branded 
product 
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